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What is a suitable definition of "God, 11 and what is 
implied by that definition? For the past fifty y~ars, 
Charles Hartshorne has persistently attempted to answer 
this question. Professor Hartshorne has not been content 
with merely analyzing the views of· his philosophtcal·and 
theological colleagues.concerning the conception of deity. 
Since the early 1930's, in scores of journal articles and 
some ten books, he has been con~tantly involved in a radi-
cal reconstruction of theistic philosophy. ~is efforts 
have born fruit in the form of a,bol~ and novel doctrine.of· 
theism, which he variously terJP,s "surrelativism," 11panen-
theism," "dipolar theism"· and "neoclassical theism. 11 A 
leading expounder of the process philosophy of Alfred North 
Whitehead, Hartshorne has for many years vigorously de-
fended metaphysics as ~ legitimate area of philosophical 
inquiry, and, in more recent years, has just as vigorously 
defended the intellectual respectability of Anselm's onto-
logical argu~ent for the existence of God. Hartshorne's 
work is especially important to theologians interested in 
applying the insights of process philosophy to theological 
problems and to those who see the need for a reconstruction 
1 
2 
of traditional metaphysical concepts. 
Like Whi tehea9-, Hartsh.orne conceives philosophy in the 
grand manner of such men as.Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, 
Descartes an4 Leibniz. That is to say, ph~losophy-is pri-
marily and essentially metaphysics. By "metaphysics" is 
meant.an investigation into "the most gener~l features of 
phenomena and things, 111 an attempt· to formulate "an 
a priori tl;i.eory of reality, 11 2 and "a. vi.ew of·. first prin-
ciples that is livable and rationally defensible. 113 
Moreover, it·is a central Hartshorpean conviction that 
metaphysics is essentially religious. "Metaphysics-evapo-
ra,tes into thin air, or it leads us to religion,"·he 
writes. 4 Since he is convinced of'.the incorrectness of the 
first alternative-~which articulates the positivist notion 
that· metaphysics is really non5ense--his metaphysics is 
closely allied with religious considerations. Religion.is 
for Hartshorne a matter of worship, and he considers it the 
philosopher's.task in this regard to clarify and draw out 
the implications· of that which religion considers the refer-
ent of worship. Hartshorne fin~s t~at~ traditionally (at 
least in the West), "God'' is the name· for the "One who is 
worshipped. 115 As a philosophical theologian, then, Harts-
horne is cqncerned with developing a logic of theism. Be-
ginning with a basic idea of God, he proceeds to determine 
what further conceptions and consequences that idea logi-
cally entails. He also wishes to determine which concep-
tions are logically incompatib+e with it, and finds several 
3 
time-honored notion~, which have virtually attained the 
status of theological orthodoxy, that fail the test of con~ 
sistency. Interior logical consistency is thus a primary 
criterion for judging a conception of God. But it is not 
the only one. Adequacy to experience is no less important. 
Concepts which have no analogue. in our experience-~human 
experience--cann0t, he argues, be meaningfully applied to 
God, not.even for the ostensible purpose of safeguarding 
his perfection, superiority and tra:i:iscendence. 6 It is one 
of Hartshorne's met~odological theses that the concepts we 
use must derive ultimately from experience as we know it. 
Yet, he also holds that human experience provides a touch-
stone from which we may generalize our concepts to apply to 
non-human experience, both above and below the human level. 
This essay proposes to focus on a· particular aspect 
of Hartshorne's theism, namely his contention that becoming, 
and hence such Ciltegories as potentiality, temporali ty, 
relativity, must be admitted as constitutive of God. Such 
an admission seems to stand in contradiction to views held 
by many eminent thinkers. Tp cite perhaps the clearest ex-
ample of this we can recall St. Thomas Aquinas' insistence 
on God as "act us purus," or pure actuality- - actuality, 
moreover, that .is not derived from any previous process of 
actualization.7 Aquinas (and many others are of the same 
mind on this issue) will not admit any becoming or poten-
tiality in God because to.do so would imply in him a lack 
of something, and since a lack, it is argued, implies; 
4 
imperfection, the divine reality must la~k nothing. Harts-
horne, on th.e other_ hand, 4enies that to lack s0mething is 
ipso factQ an imperfection. For Aquinas, God is the.Divine 
Being who is beyond the reach of becoming and change; all 
that he can (conceivably and appropriately) be, he _is, in 
one eternal state of actuality. For Hartshorne, God is the 
Divine Becoming, who includes all change and becoming with: 
in himself; all thathe can be, he either is, or will be, 
not in any once-and-for-all state of actµality, but in 
successive states of.actualization. 
In order to maintain God's supremacy, his superiority 
to. all others (for only thus is he truly worshipful, as 
religion inststs), Hartshorne conc~ives God. to change only 
in the ~irection of. increase in value, that is, only for 
the better. God, unlike any other individual, has unlim-
ited potentialitf for increase in value, and is therefore 
categorically supreme. As new values emerge into reality, 
become actual, God unfailingly possesses them. Before. 
those values became actµal, God could not haye possessed 
them, for they were not "there" to possess. Thus, God 
becomes the actµal possessor.of values as they- themselves. 
become actual. Prior to their becoming actµal, it must·be 
said that God actually lacks (b,ut .potentially possesses) 
them. 
This view, of course, rests on tbe contention that 
God cannot simply be out~ide the temporal process. Harts-
horne's God, in a very important-respect, is t1in time. 11 
5 
And since time seems to be correlated to ~ecqming, it would 
appear that tbe category of,becoming must apply to God. 
Herein lies the heart of Hartshorne's radical reconstruc-
tion of the traditional manner of conceiving deity. Pre-
viously, there has· been a tendency tQ balk at conceiving 
God temporally; deity, it was insisted, must be atemporal. 
The philosophical category most appropriate, to God was, ac-
cordingly, "being." Hartshorne's contention, is that "be-
coming" is no less, and in a significant sense is .even 
more, appropriately applicable to God. 
Expository.and critical remarks in this thesis·will 
focus on Hartshorne's conception of God as the divine be-
coming. Not only will the claim that.his theism is more 
philosoph~cally coherent an,~ defensible than more tradi-
tional theistic concepts be evaluated, but also his claim 
that it is more faithful to apd illuminative of the.reli-
gious·dimension of our lives will be c9nsidered critically. 
FOOTNOTES 
1charles Hartshorne~ Beyond Humanism: Essays in the 
Philosophy of Nature (Chicago: Willett, Clark. and-Co., 
1937; reprint ed~, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1968)' p. 255. . 
2charles Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection (La 
Salle, Illinois: Open Courr-Publishiilg Co. , · 196 2) , p. ix. 
3charles I{artshorne, Creative Synthesis an.dPhilo-
sophic Method (LaSalle, Illinois: Open ~ourt'.Publishing 
Co~, 1970), p. xvi. 
4charles Hartshorne, Man-' s Vision, of God an<;l the Logic. 
of Theism (Chicago: Willett, Clark anU-Co., 1941; re-
print ed., Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1964), 
p. 346. . . . 
5charles Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time 
(LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publish.ing Co-.-,-1967)-,--
p. 3. 
6As an example, a fairly recent-statement by Harts-
horne concerning the idec;i. of "creation ex n:i,.hilo" may be 
cited:. "According to th,e old view, as set . forth 'by most 
theologians and philosophers, God influences all things, 
nothing influences God. For him there are no 'stimuli'; 
hence when he influences or stimulates the world, it _is ·in 
a wholly different,.way from the ordinary way. For normally, 
a stimulus or cause is-but a previous effect, or response 
to some still earlier stimulus; yet God, it was. thought, 
does not respond. He just--c.reates, 'out of nothing. 1 I 
think this was a.mischievously unclear,way of talking. We 
know creativity only as a responding to prior stimuli, and 
if we refuse to allow an analogy between such ordinary 
creative action and the ¢Ii vine 'creating' of the cosmos,, we 
are using a wqrd. wh0se_ mea~ing we -cannot provide .11 
Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, p. 12. 
7see Anton C. Pegis, e<;l~, Basic Writings of St. Thomas 
Aquinas (Z vols.; New York: Random House, 1945)-,-I, 26. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF 
HARTSHORNE'S THpISM 
In commenting on Anselm's ~mtological argument, 
Charles Hartshorne has stated several times that one.must· 
have a ~etaphysics.before he can begin to understand, let. 
1 alone to defend or attack, the import of that argument. 
This s~ggestion is germane to understanding Hartshorne's 
own conception of God. Preliminary to an examination of 
this conception of. God, it is·. helpful to have some under-
standing of the metaphysical "foundation"- on which it 
rests. Consequently, a brief, but reasonably adequate, 
summary of Hartshorne 's principal metaphysical views is in 
order. An exhaustive·exposition of these views will not be 
undertaken, however, as attention in later sections will 
focus only on one of the major features of·Hart~hornels 
theism, namely, the. doctrine that the. category. of. becoming, 
or process, is applicable to deity, The .Primary concern in 
this chapter, then, is t4e metaphysic~! doctrine that "pro-
cess is reality." Finally, an account of how Hartshorne's 




Becoming as the Fundamental Category 
The "metaphysical context" in whi\;h Charles Harts-
horne's conception of G9d is expounded and elucidated is a 
systematic and far-reaching attempt to overcome a long tra-
dition in Western thought, a tradition which took "being" 
to be the ultimate and most general category applicable to 
reality. This· emphasis· on being as the primary metaphysi-
cal category, which characterizes the mainstream of specu-
lative philosophy from Parmeni~es to Martin Heidegger, 
belongs to what Hartshorne terms "classical, metaphysics," 
and which he characterizes as a "metaphysics of being, sub-
stance, absoluteness, an~ necessity as primary concep-
tions. 112 In its . attempt to, elucidate· that which is perma-
nent apd enduring "underlying" the flux of changing 
phenomena, classical metaphysics tended to make being 
prior to, and in some cases more real than, becoming, 
change, process. To give an obvious and, familiar example, 
it may be recalled that Plato divided reality into a 
higher, superior level, the realm of the Forms, and a 
lower, inferior level~ the realm of sensib~e things--with 
"being" correlative to the former and 11becoming 11 to the 
latter. Moreover, Plato gave the classic statement of the 
principle on which the distin~tion of superior and inferior 
• levels.is made, namely, that· the most real is that which is 
immutable, invariable and ever self-consistent. 3 Becoming 
is thus taken to be an inferior mode of reality, derivative 
from peing. 
9 
It.is precisely this point of view against which Harts-
horne has been co.ntending for most of his phtlosophical 
career. His own.view, which he call~ "neoclassical meta-
physics,".understands becoming to qe t~e primary category, 
inclusive of being. He writes 
There is ... a tra6itipn that becoming is a sec-
ondary mod~ of reali tY, infer:ipr to and less real 
than.being .. Our view affirms.the centrary, that, 
'becoming is re,ality itself' (Bergson)-, and being 
only an aspect of this reality. 4 
It should be not~d that· in taking becoming to be the pri-
mary met~physical category, the reality of being is not. 
denied. What is denied is the notion that being consti-
tutes, or is. illuminative of, the fundamental features of 
reality~ Hartshorne is e~~licit on this point in his in- · 
troductory remarks in Philosopherp Speak of God, where he 
writes: 
.being becomes, or.becoming is~-being and be-
coming muse somehow for~ a single reality. Mod-
ern philosophy differs from most previous 
philosophy by the strength of· its conviction that 
'becoming is the m0re inclusive category. Th~s 
does·not meaµ that it is 'more real. 1 We can 
afustract from the stages of.becoming various real 
common feature~ and call, these 'being.'~ 
Thus·, l{artshorne can. claim that whereas being is "nothing 
apart. from process" it is still ''by no means nothil}g or. 
negligible in process. 116 
This last claim- -that being is -nei.ther apart' from nor 
negligible in process, or becoming--provides-the basic· con-
ception upon which Hartsh9rne's understanding of being 
rests. FoF it is by reference to becoming that he defines 
being, not vice versa; that is, being, for Hartshorne, is 
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"that which dees net becqme." Accordingly, qeing is that 
category.which refers to those features -of reality which 
are characterize~ by fixity, stability, self-identity 
through time and change, and. permanence·· 7 Being is t4e un7 
created as contrasted with the created, constancy as con-
trasted wit4 variability, 8·and the non-navel as contrasted 
with the novel, 9 Hartshorne thinks of being as the non-
dynamic• nonactive.aspect of reality. 
In speaking of the views of other thinkers, most 
notably Bosanquet, Royce., an9- Aquinas, Ha,rtshorne ac-:-
knowledges that being can also. be associated with the-af-
fi rmation, that ,'''there is' a total reality, once for all, 
not on+y·inclusive of all.that has happened but· of 'future 
events' ·in their full detail. . . .. 1110 However, this con-
ception ef being is rejecte9,, as it s~ems ,to involve 
"severe ,paradoxes. 1111 
The principle on which the primacy. of beceming is ·· 
based can. be -ini tialJ,.y formulated thus:.· for any two con-
cepts, X and Y; Xis more·fundamental and ultimate than Y 
if X inclu~es.Y. Moreever, X includes Y if Y can be ab-
stracted from X,· but net.vice -versa. J,.Z 
Hartshorne's reasons f~r hel,.ding that becoming in~ 
eludes, and therefore.is more·fun9-amenta;L than, being may 
be. summarized as fellows. Reality is characterized by. both1 
being an~ becoming. These-two factors.must go together· to 
form a unified conceptien of reality; that is, they must· be 
related in· such a way that neither is "outside" the other. 
11 
Otherwise, "t:q .. e total reality 'What becomes· and what does 
not,' is left undescribed, and so the dQctrine [of reality] 
is left unfinished. 1113 Viewed as a whol~, then-, reality 
exhibits fixed, permanent, self-identical features, and 
dynamic, novei, emerging features. But, as new items 
emerge, or become) and furnish themselves as additions.to 
the content.of reality, they make· the total reality itself 
a new reality, enhanced by the incorporation of previously 
nonexistent.items. In other wor~s, becoming does not just 
describe a portion of reality. On the contrary, runs 
Hartshorne' s argument, if any. portion of the. whole })ecomes ., 
the whole itself becomes~ for it.is thereby a· new whole: 
The 'Philosophy of Process' is not the result of 
an arbitrary preference for becoming, but of the 
logical insight th~t, given a variable V and a 
constant·C, the togetherness of the two, VC, must 
be a variable. Variability is.the ultim(lte 
conception. 14 
Again, he says: "What· bec,:0mes and, what does. not become 
(but simply is) together constitute a total reality which 
15 
becomes." As long as the world process continues, new 
items are constantly emerging anq "reality as .,a whole" 
never has the character of permanence necessary to asso-
ciate it with being. The incorporation_ of· instanc,:es of 
becoming insures that the tqtal real is itself. always 
becoming. 
Since that which becpmes and that which does.not be-
come forms a total reality which becpmesi being (as that 
which does not become) must be the included reality, not: 
the inclusive reality. Hartshorne observes that "the point 
12 
often overlooked here is that the common element is cort-
tained in the diverse realities &s· a 'common· denominator,' 
an abstraction. . . 
,,16 Being is thus an abstractton from 
becoming. As such., it can never refer to "reality as a 
whole." This meap.s ·that "terms -.like 'reality,'· or 'the 
universe,' or 'the truth' have no single.referent, fixed 
once for all, but· acquire a partly new denotation each time 
they are use<;I. 1117 
The above consi<;lerations carry weight only on the as~ 
sumption that being and becoming are real; that is, the 
argument assumed that-becoming is not illusory. But if 
pec9ming is an illusion there is really no question of 
whether being includes becoming or-becoming includes being.· 
In this case, becqming only appears to be. real, leaving 
being as the sole reality. · "In other· words," Hartshorne 
observes, "the only way to make bec9ming less than being is. 
to deny that· there is any real. becoming. u18 
This alternative is rejecte<;l on th.e grounds that the 
formulation, ·~eing alone is real, there is really no 
change, no becoming,", expresses no coherent idea and is 
therefore meaningless: 
For it may be argued ... that being, in the form 
of fixed law, ca~not be abs plute, since this . 
would make becoming an illusion; however, being 
too would be illusory, because all terms involve 
contrast, and if. there is only being, 'being' is 
meaningless. On the other hand, becoming can be 
absolute in a certain sense, withou~ making 
being an.illusion. 19 
The salient poin_t .of the above remark is the contentton 
that ideas are dependent. o:p. contrast for their meaning. 
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Especially is. this.true for what Hartshorne terms ·"ultimate 
contrasts,'' such as _being and becoming. Each term in a 
pair of contrasting terms must· have· an. illustration, or 
exemplification; if .either· of ·the ~erms is without illus-
tration, is unreal, then the cpntrast cannot be present, 
and, both terms are.meaningless. Acc;:ordingly, reEJ.lity can,-
not be sheer being, all-pervasive permanence and immutEJ.-
bility, for then becoming would have no exemplification. 
Nor can reality be. sheer becoming, all-pervasive imper-
manence and change, for then being woul~ have no exemplifi-
cation. Both must be admitt~~' or neither can be admitted. 
In. taking this position, Hartshorne derives. support 
from Morris Cohen's. "principle of.polarity," which "may be 
generalized. as the principle~ not: of identity, but.of the 
necessary copresence and mutual <;Iependence of opposite 
determinations."20 CoheI1 is concerned to warn against "the 
greatest bane·of philosophizi~g, to wit~ the easy arti-
ficial dilemma between unity and plurality, rest and mo-
tion, substance and function, actual anc;I idea;J.., etc. 1121 
Furthermore_, he argues that "The law of contradiction does 
not bar the presence of contrary determin.at~ons. in the same 
entity, but only requires as a·postulate the existence of a 
distinction of aspects·or relations in which the contraries 
hold. 1122 
The Concrete .Units of Reality 
But what, more·specifical;J..y, is it t4at becomes? That is 
14 
to say, wha~ are the most fundamental; concrete units ·or 
elements of· reality? As ·Hartshorne reads the history of 
philosophy, metaphysical schemes that took "being" to he· 
the ultimate category tenQ.ed also tp make "substances" the 
ul ti:m_ate cons ti tu~nts · of e<;:mcrete reality, By "sups tan<;:e 11 
is meant a self-same something that en4ures through change, 
a "bearer" of qualities or accidents., or, as Hartshorne has-
i t 1 "a 'being' to which a~ventures happen, or experiences 
occur; to make it the primary conception is to assume the 
priority of being. 1123 Or again, by "substance 11 , is some-
times meant an enduring subject· of change which does not· 
itself. change. 
Hartshorne' s alternative to the idea of substa:J;l_ce as. 
the primary unit of· conc;reteness .. is- the notion of the 
momentary event, stat~ or occasion: "the unit of concrete 
reality is the state or singular event. 11 24 These eve.nts 
are occasions._of experience,, feeling or awareness; they are 
"pulses of. experience" and are to be conceived analogously 
to Whitehead's actual entities. Hence, "The 1,lnits.of 
reality ... are unit-experiences, 'experient occasions,' or 
1 actual entities' ... 1125 William Christian's characteri-
zation of·Whitehead1s notion of "actual entities" is 
he.lpful in understanding ~artshorne's notion of event: 
"Actual entities are the real things. (res verae) of which 
the uni verse is made· up. An actual entity is an exper-
iencing subject and.is constituted by its experience. Its 
experience is its reai inte. rnal conS? ti tution. 1126 Reality 
is conceived as a.plurality of these events, or occasions 
of experience, 
1~ 
Events· (in contrast to substances) are not. themselves 
enduring, permanent things; rather, they are fleeting, 
transient, momentary pulses or 11 dro~s" (Whitehead's.term) 
of experience. 27 This. does not mean that the idea of an 
enduring individual or enduring subject is eliminated or 
disregard~d. It does meap that such ordinary phrases .as· 
uidentical entity, 11 "same individual~ 11 and "same subject" 
really refer to common. features-or patterns abstracted from . ~~. . 
a series qf events. Hartshorne prefers to. say that the 
identical individual or subject is· "in",the sequence of 
events which characterize.it, and·not that the sequence is. 
. h . d" "d 1 28 in t e in .1v1 ua . · The potion of substance, he argues, 
has traditionally involved the latter formulation as car-. 
rectly e 1ucidating the rel aticm. between "individual" or 
"subject" and "expe11ience." But this "noticm.of substance 
that it is an identical entity cont~ining suc~essive 
properties is. ,·.a.misleading way of describing an indi-
vidual enduring through chapge. 1129 
Ordin~ry sense perception is incapable of disclosing 
to us these concrete singulars which.constitute reality. 
That- is to say, we.cannot.lay holP, of them directly by 
focusing our attention on the world around us; all we see. 
here are composites, or_ "societies 1·1 of such singulars, an.d 
not the singulars themselves. Where, the11, are· they to be 
found, if not in external perception? Hartshorne's answer. 
16 
is that the only model by which we may form. a conception of 
singular events is our, own consciousness, whi~h provides us 
with.the necessary data--singular pulses of experience--
from which we may construct a theqry.of. concrete singulars, 
The human specious present is the only epoch we 
directly experience with any vividness .... In 
perceiving the non-human world we are always 
apprehending collectives., both spatial and tem-
poral. To form even a vague conception of the 
singulars composing these collectives our only 
resource is t<::> generalize analogically the 
epochal and atomic characters of human e~per-
iences. 3U 
Human consciousness may thus be taken as a kind of inter-
pretive key by which we may achieve, with some.measure of 
adequacy, insights into the structure of reality. 
In elucidating the structure of "event," Hartshorne 
places special emphasis on its "creative-;-synthetic 
nature. 1131 He means by this that every event, every pulse 
of. experience, is a self-creation. To grasp his meaning 
here, we must.make use of our interpretive model and con-
sult our own experience. Analyzing human consciousness, 
Hartshorne finds that each specific experien~e is a felt 
unity. To be sure, there· are many factors. which contribute 
to the making of.a particular experience, but these various 
factors converge and beco:in~ one.in that experience. The 
elements .. of·an experience, which may be said to cause that 
experience, are many, but. the experience its elf is always 
one; a unity. 
Now, it may seem that, since a.unity is a unity of 
something, a single experience is, paradoxically, both a 
17 
one and a many. But "many" here refers to factors which 
are· antecedent to the experience they make up by subsequent-
ly flowing together. The "one" refers .. to the experience as 
immediately present, Antecedent factors provide the data 
for subsequent experiences, but they do not provide for 
their own unity in that experience. This unity is pre-
cisely the novel feature, the element of becoming, in each 
single experience; and each' experience may therefore be 
said to create itself by creating its own, unity.· Harts-
horne exp 1 ains : · 
A person experiences, at a given moment, many 
things at once, objects perceived, past experi~ 
ences remembered. That he perceives certain 
objects and remembers certain things, we can 
more or less explain: the objects are there, the 
experiences. are recent and. connected by associa-
tions .with the objects;, and so on. But· an exper-
ience is not fully d~scribed in its total unitary 
quality merely by specifying what .. it perceives 
and remembers. There is the question of.how, 
with just what accent, in just what perspective 
of relative vividness and emotional coloring, the 
perceiving and remember~ng are done, And no 
matter how we deduce requirements for these as-
pects from the causes; we still have omitted the 
unity of all the factors and aspects. There is 
the togetherness of them all, in a unity of 
feeling which gives each perception and each 
memory its unique place and value in this exper-
ience, such as it could have in no otner:-
Causal explanation is incurably pluralistic: on 
the basis of many past events, it has to explain 
a single present. event or experience. It is, 
then, simple logic that something is missed by 
the causal account. Not because of our ignor-
ance of causes: if we knew them all, the multi-
plicity of causal factors.would only be the more 
obvious, and so would the jump from the many to 
the new unity. From a, b, c, d ..• one is to 
derive the exferience of a, b, c, d. , .and not 
just an experience of them, but. precisely this 
experience of them. There can be no logic---roT 
such a derivation. The step is not logical, 
but a free creation. Each experience is thus a 
free act, in its final unity a "self-created". 
actuality, enriching the sum of actualities by. 
one new member~32 
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Hence, experience, with regar4 to human consciousness 
at least, is a felt unity which comes, into being with the 
experience; or better, it should be said that the felt 
unity is the experience. As such, its peculiar unity, its 
sensuous immediacy, is not determined by its data, the fac-
tors which constitute it, That unity is created by the 
synthesis of its antecedent data; it is a creative syn-
thesis because the resultant experience is "unpredictable, 
incompletely determined in advance by causal conditions and 
laws. Accordingly, it means additions to the definiteness 
of reality. 1133 
Hartshorne interprets the entir~ cosmos as operating 
on.this model, making creativity "a.fundamental principle, 
a category applicable to all reality. 11 34 The cosmos at 
every moment is a vast panorama of pulses of experience, 
each pulse creating itself as a novel, emergent synthesis, 
a new unity. 
Thus far, mention has been.made of the data which is 
antecedent:to any event, or experience, but which is·subse-
quently synthesized into a singular nov~l experience, with-
out adequately characterizing it. That characterization 
must now be made. It. is simply this: the data which go to 
make up experiences are themselves experiences. And, since 
every experience, as we have seen, manifests a creative-
synthetic nature, these "data-experiences'·' are· themselves 
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"prior acts of synthesis. 11 35 Consequently, each, experience 
is a synthesis of preyious. experiences, eve11~s, or actual 
entities; these latter furnishing the~selves as constitu-
ents. to be·subsequentiy synthesized: "Experient.occasions 
have previous sue~ occasions, whether· or not closely simi-
lar to themselves, as their data. 1136 We must also note, 
that this acCO\lnt is at odds with "the view that data may 
in.some cases be bits of mere matter or merely ~aterial 
processes~. 'vacuous' of any internal life, feeling, or 
value. ,,37 
Hartshorne's anaiysis here is in close agreement with 
Whitehead's do~trine, "The many become one. and are· in,.. 
creased by· one. ,,3g Experiences, for both, Whitehead and 
Hartshorne, are inclusive realities, the previous experi-
ences which fu~nish themselves as data being th~ include~ 
factors. An experience, no .matt~r on what level, is always 
an experience of, other experiences. Hartshorne often re-
fers to this phenomenon as the "feeling of' feeling." In 
its fullest metaphysical articulation, "The .world may-be 
conceived as the incr~asing specification of the theme 
'feeling of feeling. ' 1139 
Reality, according to Har~shorne, is thus a process, 
a dynamic becoming in which e~periences come together· and 
form novel experiences, which in turn furnish,themselves as 
items in subsequent bec9mings. Incessant.movement.is a 
u11iversal thread woven into t~e very structure of reality, 
in which novel unities, in the form of. creative-synthetic 
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events,, cqntinually emerge. The old maxim that. everything 
changes except change itself is n0t, an improper. description 
of tl;l.is metaphysic, for,· as .Hartsh.orpe says, "Process it-
self does not emerge, in·eternitr or· anywhere else. It 
simply is, without alternative. 11 40 
However, as the apove remarks have hopefully indi-
cated, reality is not merely a process, but it is also a 
social process. Reality is social inasmuch as its basic 
constituents display "the appeal of life for life, of ex- · 
perience for experience"; each pulse of.experience, each 
new itc;lm of emergent novelty, is ·a ~"shared experiencet, 
the echo, of one experience in another. 1141 Actual entities. 
are constituted by-the feeling of each ot4er 1 s feelings. 
The constitutive experiences.and feelings are dra~n from 
that entity's own·past experiences, as _well.as from the 
experiences -and feelings of other entities. In fac:t, since 
Hartshorne adheres -to the Buddhistic doctrine that every. 
individual is a plurality of-.selvesi one's own past is in a 
sense "other". to him. It ,may thus provide the data for fu-
ture e~periences.4 2 "To be·s9cial;" Hartshorne writes, ttis 
to weave one.'s own life qut"of·strands taken from th~ lives· 
of others and to furnish one's own· life a~.a strand to be 
woven. into their liy~s .. 11 ~ 3 
Reaii1;y is also, on this v:Lew, a._ cumulative phenomenon. 
Every emergent phase of becoming is an incorporation of· 
previous phases. of bec<;>ming, "the participation of· exp er- . 
iences ·in.other experiences~ 1144 Reality gets built-up into 
more and greater structures of, complexity. Each new item 
that becomes is itself a new synthesis of,previous,.items, 
which were themselves syntheses of previous items. More-
over, after having become, an experience offers itself as 
an available item for some subsequent pulse of becoming, 
thus forming a new many. Again, it is appropriate to re-
call Whitehead's maxim, "The many become one, and are in:-
creased by one." In an essay on Whitehead, Hartshorne 
summarizes this doctrine: 
But .what pluralist had ever clearly stated thai 
it is the destiny of the many to enter into a 
novel unity, an additional reality, which, since 
we are dealing with a principle~ not a mere fact, 
must in its turn be unified with.the others in a 
further unity~ and so on without end? We have 
here an admission not mere+y of emergence, but 
of emergent or creative synthesis as the very 
principle of process and re~lity. This is 
brought out 1 in another phrase, defining the 
t Principle of Re la ti vi ty'' : 'To be is to be a 
potential for every [subsequent] becoming' (Cf. 
PR, 33). Each item of reality has the destiny 
or forming material for endlessly compounded and 
recompounded acts of synthesis--producing new 
and more complex realities.45 
It may be remar~ed that the concept of being finds 
application in this account as having reference to the 
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pastness-of events, experiences, etc. After having become, 
the items of becoming are. That is to say, after events 
become, they achieve a measure of definiteness, stability 
a~d permanence. Thus, in any concrete instance of self-
creative becoming, the data-experiences to be unified into 
a new whole do not themselves become in that particular 
synthesis; having previously bec9me, they are. Hartshorne 
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says that "The products 9f creaticm can~ot be until· they are 
created, but having been created they are bQund henceforth 
to be. 1146 Furthermore, the-transition from present to past 
is not· characterized by any diminishing of former reality. 
Hartshorne eschews Whitehead's use of. "perish:i,.ng" in this 
regard as a dangerous metaphor, as it seems to imply·that 
past events'are "dead, lacking in·subjec;ttve·activity. 1147 
Even ts J: in becoming past, are net thereby "annihilated, 11 do 
net cease to be uni ts of experience.. They retain their 
subjective constitution. 
This facet· of Hartshor:rie 's thought is terJlled ''pan-
psychism," frem the Greek, meaning "all soul.'' It is the 
doctrine that each concre~e singular is composed of 
feeling, or awareness, or "units of experiencing.u48 The 
chief contention of panpsychism is ·that·· feeling or e:x:per~ 
ience· or subjective activity is,not peculiar to one, class 
of entities, for instance tl:ie animal· kingdom. Rather·, it 
extends to subhuman·en~ities also, such a~ cellsw molecules 
and electrons. Or, in Hartshorne' s words: ". . .matter is. 
experience on various subh~an levels, 1149 Again; Harts.,. 
horne is following the lead.of Wh,itehead in ~enying that 
nature, on any level, exhibi~s ''vacuous ac:tuality, 11 or tl:iat 
any· aspect of nature. is merely .insentient anQ. ''deacil." 
Lest it:be thought that Hartshorne i.s here expounding 
an unmitigated animism, whereby it is held that such things 
as trees-and rocks are unitary individuals experiencing 
joys and sorrows, it.should be recalled that it is the 
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concrete singulars who are experienGing subjects. But they 
do not exist by themselves, in isolation; each conerete 
singular is invariably a member of a society of: singulars. 
And depending on the extent to whi~h the society is unified 
and presi<:led .. over; by a dominant and controlling member (in 
much the same fashion that .Plato held the .soul to be dom-. 
inant over the body), it may or n:i.ay. not be said to be a· 
feeling individual. In any ca,se, each,physically perceived 
objec~ is held to be a. composite of concrete singulars, a 
"society of·. actual occasions." The composite itself (for 
instance, a tree) may :i;iot feel. or experience, but its con-, 
stituents., the.cells (and perhaps their constit1,1ents), may· 
do so. Thus 
The main subdivisions-of.the class 'societies of 
occasions'· consist of the linear.or 'personally 
ordereci' societies, the famJ.l+ar example being a 
'stream.of c0nstiousness' of a single person, 
and nonlinear societies~ such a~ a· tree con-
siderea as acoleny of.cells. Perhaps each cell 
is personally ordered but probably not the tree. 
One form of nonlinear, society is that which, un-
like ·the tree, is acc9mpanied by a 0 linear.society 
of 'presiding occasions.' A live human.body 
with its 'mind' or 'soul.' is the example nearest. 
at hand.so · · · 
Composites, then, are.not necessarily experiencing 
things. But, even though they may not experience, their 
constituents may., Some composite things, on the other 
hand, have as·a constituent a dominating member, which 
unifies the experiences of. the constituents over which·it· 
presides. Human conscious experience provides the paradigm 
here, as has .already been observed. To make the paradigm 
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applicable to non-human, aspects of reality, ttwe must gener-
alize, extend into an. infinitely flexible an.alogy, the 
basic traits. tnus ;accessible to us. u51 At the same time, 
one must guard against sµpposing that~ in generalizing the 
concept of feeling to inclµde lower grades of entities, he 
will thereby know the specific details .of those·modes of 
feeling. A bird, a single .,.,~elled microbe., an electron, all 
may be.possessed of feeling or.experienc;e in some.fashion, 
but in just what specific fashion cannot, perhaps, be 
known. Accordingly, the panpsychistic view "does .. not un-
dertake to tell us what particular sorts of·souls oth~r. 
than the human tnere are; only comparative psychology can 
do that. 11 52 
God as World-Process 
When fully generalized, the principle that· societies 
of occasions »are themselves incluc;led in larger societies·· 
yields the notion that th~ uni verse is .the largest and most 
inclusive reality of all, having for its cc:mstituents f(r'lery 
singular entity, as well as all composite entities. Ac-
cording to_ the process view of\ reality, the unive~se is to 
be conceived as the c9smi~ society, or the cosmic c9mmu-
nity; yet· it is not itself a member of any larger society 
or whole. The cosmic conu:nunity would have nothing external 
to itself to which it could be related. "There is nowhere 
to go from the universe, 11 53 says Hartshorn~. And since 
. ' 
the cosmos has no. exterJ1al environment, all of its 
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relations must be internal ones. Hence, the cosmos is the· 
all-inclusive reality. It cannot be a: stat~c, unchanging 
reality, for inasmuch as- its constituents l:>ec~¥le, the uni-
verse. becomes also. The cosmic coPU11uni ty is va ticreative 
advance" into novelty. 
Furthermore, the cosmic community must not be thought 
of as a mere collection of parts. A collection has no 
functional unity, no ordered integration, with.respect to 
its members. A collectic;m is thus "one" in a more trivial 
sense than something with functional unity, say a human in-
dividual, or an individual cell. The cosmos must be con.-
ceived as, at least, a whole:--if not as an "individual.u 
The· question then naturally arises, what provides ,for the 
wholeness, the unity? The· answer, put .. bluntly, is that ·the 
cosmos itself does--it creates its own.unity, ju~t as any 
subordinate' actual occasion does! Indeed, the cosmos is· an 
actual occasion, a unit-experience; or~ more properly, it 
is a.series of such occasiens~ since its:unity is not a 
once-and-for-all achievement, but· a continuing process. 
The universe becomes, creates itself a novel whole, with 
each in~lusion or synthesis of its (continually emetging) 
constitue:p.ts .. 
It is on the level of cosmic wholeJ1.eSs .and unity that. 
t~e conceRt of God appears in.Hartshorne 1 s metap~ysics. He 
argues. that the unitary·· character of the· cosmos· is best. 
understood as. !""Wholeness imposed on it "by a single.dom-
inant all-ruling member. 11 54 A. society whose members were 
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not· subordinate to /'1 ·ruling entity would be a society in 
jeopardy of disintegration thro~gh la~k of.mutual coopera-
tion by its members. In such a society, th~ qecisions and 
actions :of the mempers woul9. ineyi tal?ly come into greater 
and greater conflict, so that 
Nothing would guarantee the continuance ·of the 
society from moment to moment save the infinite 
good luck th.at they all happened to. use their. 
freedom in ways serviceabl~ to the society ..... 
If there were no radically dominant ,meip.ber, able 
to set· limits:to the chaotic.possibilities of 
indivi4ual freedom~ it s,ems .that ,there would be 
no reason.why the scheme.of things should not 
dissolve in a chaos of unmitigated conflict; 
that is to say, in the cessation of all feeling 
and activity throµgh the irresistible force of 
unbearaple frustration.SS 
Elucidation.of the process~ or social, concept of Go~ 
amounts, at the same time, to a ferm of the.design argument 
for the existence of God. Thus, it is an a priori form of 
the.design argument. Iiartsh9rnels reasoning is.not an in-
ference from the fact· of order, coherence and regularity 
exhibited by our worJ.d, to the, conc1usion that there must 
be a· cosmic, orderer for this world. Instead, he argues 
th,at for any possible· world there must.be-such an ordering 
power, for the.reason that· cosµiic, order is inher~nt and 
necessary in "worldness" as such.S6 Put another way, he 
holds "that reality should be.reality it may be .. necessary 
that a certain individual should be real, for this indivi-
dual may be t~e ·ground of all reality ."s 7 The "individual 11 
here referred to is the·cosmos.in its creative-synthetic 
aspect, or, in other words, God. 
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Great pains are taken by Har~shorne to make clear that 
God's coercive power in providin~ order, coherence and con~ 
tinuity to the cosmic process does not eliminate or render 
negligible the freedom and power of the lesser beings over 
whom he rules~ Unlike many before him, Hartshorne does not 
think of God as having a monopoly on power. Rather, he 
understands God "as the.being uniquely able to maintain the 
society of which it is member, the only· social being uncon-
ditionally able to guaran~ee the survival, the minimal 
integrity, of its society, and of itself as member. of that 
society. n58 He hastens·. to add that powe~ so conceived is 
not the power to remove all possibility of conflict, for 
that would necessitate eliminating freedom also. God's 
ordering power. extends .. only so far as "to set limits to the 
freedom of others ... to set the best or optimal limits to 
freedom. , 1159 Balance between freedom and coercion, 
resulting in an order and coherence within which creativity, 
and hence genuine becoming and advance, is possible--this 
i'.s, in admittedly general terms, what Go cl accomplishes as 
the cosmic orderer of worlds. Employing the notion of a 
dominant~ or presiding, agent as a "monarchical society," 
Hartshorne writes 
The 'monarch' sees to it,that there is enough in-
voluntary or unconscious cooperation to make vol-
untary forms ·Of cooperation possible without· 
intolerable risks. Men can freely decide to aid 
each other in this way· or in that because it is 
decided for them that, whatever they do, the 
basic cooperations that maintain the society will 
go on, 60 
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Mutual interaction and cooperation. (characteristics :distinc-· 
tive of, and necessary for, any·world) are possiple, Harts-
horne contends, only within· an all-inclusive reality which 
is at the same.time a singular reality.dominant over.its 
members. 
With this account, the expositionef·Hartshorne's 
fup<iamentai doctrines·in.metaphysics hasbeen accomplished. 
It has.been seen, how, beginning with the nqtion that be-
coming is the funda111ental metaphysical category, inclusive 
of being, and taking creative-synthetic units of experience 
as the ultimate concre~e singulars, God is conceived as the 
all-inclusive rea+ity who unifies and cqordinates his in-
ternal environment, adyan~ing to.novel stages with each act 
of synthesis. Such is the concept of deity generated by a 
metaphysics of becoming and process. The following chapter 
undertakes to show how this ~en~ept of·God arises out of· a 
religious starting point. 
FOOTNOTES 
lsee Charles Hartshorne, "Introduction to Second 
Edi ti on, 11 St. Anselm: Basic Writings (LaSalle, Illinois: 
Open CourtPuplishing Co,, 1962), pp. 2-3; and "What Did 
Anselm Discover?" in The Majp'-:-Faced, Argument: Recent 
Studies on the On telopcal rgumen t · ~ the·. Existence of 
God, eds. John·Hick anq Arthur C. McG1ll-----C-New York: 
Macmillan, 1967), p. 321. 
2Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection, p. xiii. 
3see·Phaedo, 78b-78e, 79d. 
4Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic 
Method, p. 13. 
5charles Hartshorne and William 
Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago: 
Press, 1953}, p. 9. 
L. Reese, eds. 
University of Chic~go 
6char;I.es Hartshorne, Realit¥ as Social Process: 
Studies in Metaphysics a:i;id Religion (Glencoe: The Free 
Press anaBoston: The Beacon Press, 1953; reprint ed., 
New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1971), p. 20. 
711 rnterrogation of Char;I.es Hartshorne, 11 in 
Philosophical Interrogations, eds. Sydney and Beatrice Rome 
(New York: Holt; Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 322. 
8Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic 
Method, pp. 13-14, · 
911 Interrogation of Charles Hartshorne," p. 321. 
lOHartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic 
Method, p. 1 7. 
11Ibid. For a discussion of some of the paradoxes, see 
Hartshorne's essay "Royce's Mistake--And Achievement," 
The Journal of Philosophy, Lil (February 2, 1956), 123-130. 
The chief diHiculty concerns the possibility of tttimeless 
truths," whicP, Hartshorne maintains is entailed by such a 
conception of being. He claims that the assertion that 
events are, in their full particularity, before they becqme 
29 
30 
is the paradox involved, aµd that there are no cogent rea-
sons to support the assertion. 
12Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic 
Method, pp. 13-14, pp. 26-27. 
13rbid., p. 14. 
14Ibid, 
1511Interrogation of Charles Hartshorne, 1·' p. 321. 
16Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic 
Method, p. 15. · 
17charles Hartshorne, "Persenal Id,entity from A to Z," 
Process Studies, II (Fall, 1972), 209. 
is Ibid. 
19Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection, p. 23. 
20Morris R. Cohen., ~ Preface to Logic (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1944), p. 75. 
21Ibid. 
22rbid., p. 74. It should be pointed out, however, that 
Cohen expressly says·that this principle is needed "to make 
logic applicable to empirical issues." Ibid,. Questions· 
involving the nature of God are not, according to Harts-
horne, empirical issues. ~-
23Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic 
Method, p. 45. 
24Ibid., p. 23, 
25charles Hartshorne, "Panpsychism,"·in A History.of 
Philosophicai sistems, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York: The 
Philosophical Library, 1950), pp. 450-451. 
26William A. Christian, An Interpretation of 
Whiteheafl' s Metaphysics (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 
1959), p. 12. 
27seeAlfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: 
An Essay in Cosmology (New York: Macmillan, 1929; reprint 
ed., New York: The.Free Press, 1969), p. 23. 
28Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis andPhilosophic 
Method, p. 20. 
29Ibid. 
30Jlartshorne, "Panpsychism," 450. 
31Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic 
Method, p. 15. 
32rbi· d 2 3 . • ' pp.' - • 
33rbid., p. 3. 
34Ibid., p. l~ 
3Scharles Hartshcnne, "The .. Phi~osqphy .of, Creative 
Synthesis," The Journal of Philosophy, LV (October 23, 
1958)' 944. ' ' ' ' 
36.Kartshorne, "Personal Identity from A to Z," 210. 
37 Ibid. 
38Whi tehead, Process and Reali 1;.y, p. 26. 
39charles .Kartshorne, The Philosophy and Psychology 
of Sen~ation (Chicago~ Tli"e""University of Chicago Press, 
1934; reprint ed., Port Washington, New York: Kennikat 
Press:, 1968)', p. 208. 
40 11 Interrogation of Gharles Hartshorne," p. 322. 
41Hartshorne, Reality-as"Social Process,, p. 34. 
42 For Hartshorne's understanding of 1;.he Buddhist 
31 
notion of the self, see his· articles, "Religion.in Process 
Philo~ophy," in Rel.igion in Philosoahi7~1.and Cultural Per-
s ectiye, eds. J. Clayton"Jfeaver an- Wi11iaii11Iorosz 
Princeton: D. Van Nostrand;, 1967), p. ~49; and "Twelve 
Elements of My Philosophy," The.Soutlrwestern.Journal of 
Philoso~hy, V (Spring, 1974),13. See also Creative-
Synthes1s and Philosophic Method, pp. xx-xxL 
43Hartshorne, Rea:Lity,~ Social Process,, p. 136. 
44Hartshorne, Creative Sy:p.thes is and Philosophic. 
Method, p. xvii. 
45c;harles Hartshori:ie, Whitehead's fhilosopht: Sel~cted 
Essays: 1935-1970 (Lincoln: University of.Ne raska 
Press, 1972), p. 162. 
46Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis an4 Phil~sophic 
Method, p. 15. 
47Hartshorne, Whitehead's PhilosoEhy, p. 165. 
48Hartshorne, "Panpsychism," 442. 
49Hartshorne, The Logi~ of Perfection,, p. 150. 
SOHartshorne, "Pe rs on al Identity from A ,to z' II 
Sll{artshorne, "Panpsychism," 445. 
52 Ibid,; see also Hartshorne, Reality as Social 
Process, pp. 34-35. 
53l{artshorne, The Logic of Perfection, p. 204. 
54Hartshorne, Reality as Soc~al Process, p. 38. 
55Ibid., p. 39. 
211. 
56Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and PhilosoEhic 
Method, p. 278. 
57Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God, p. 53. 
58Hartshorne, Reality, as Social Process, p. 41. 
59 Ibid. 
60ibid., p. 40. 
32 
CH~PTER III 
T~E GOD WHO BECOME£ 
The concept of God describe4 in· the preceding chapter 
may appear to s9me. to be,_ r.ather far removed from the God of 
which religious co:mµlun~ties and traditions speak. Indeed, 
one of. the chief criticisms which can be made against 
philosophers who speak of God. is th~t the God they conceive 
is a mere abstraction, an explanatory principle, apd not 
the u1iving God" of religion. Pascal, for instance, in 
recording his mystical experience, is emphatic that his 
encounter is with the "God of Abraham, God of Issac, God 
of Jacob, not of phil<;>soph,er? and scholars. 111 
Charles Hartshorne is sensitive to this issue~ He 
does not believe that the idea of God which he defends is 
simply a plaything of philosophers, having no connection 
with what. religion has meant by the word. He contends 
that, on the contrary~ his-view of· God may be.seen. as 
springing from a.basic religious understanding of the 
meaning of "God.'' He says that, 
In view of the large if not decisive part which. 
religion has played in the very origin of· the 
theological idea, and. in view of· the enormous 
social importance which this idea. enjoys only 
through religion, it is doubly reasonable .... to 
discover what God may be as the God of religion . 
. . . (For religion seems clearlyto nave first 
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title to the word.)2 
Although religion may have "first title to the word," 
Hartshorne is not content to simply leave it in the hands 
of religion. Religion has not said all that can be said 
about God; nor has what it has said been altogether free of 
ambiguity. Professor Hartshorne believes that philosoph-
ical analysis can be brought to bear on the religious con-
ception of· God, and that the results may well be propitious 
for both philosophy aµd religion, Accordingly, the prin-
cipal aim 0£ this chapter is to show how Hartshorne's con-
cept of God springs from an explicitly religious origin, 
and to trace its development from that origin to a full-
blown doctrine of God. 
The Religious.Conception of God 
Hartshorne's claim is that "worshipfulness" is 
religiously definitive of deity: God, for religion, "is 
the name of the One who is.worshipped. 113 By "worship" he 
does not mean just an unusually high degree of respect or 
admiration or love. Rather, "Worship is the·integrating 
of all one's thoughts- and purposes, all valuations and 
meanings, all perceptions and conc;eptions. 114 The key to 
understanding the concept of worship is found in the 
Biblical injunction to love God with all of one's heart, 
all of one's soul, all of one!s min~, and all of one's 
strength. 5 The meaning of this is clear to Hartshorne: 
The word 'all' reiterated four times in one 
sentence·means, I take it, wha't;.it says. It 
does not mean, nearly all--or, all important--
responses, or aspects of pers9nality~ Simply 
every response, every aspect, must be a.way of 
lov:i,ng God.6 
What could reasonaply be conceivec;l as worthy of such 
an all-inclusive response?. Hartshorne's answer is that 
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only a supremely excellent being, who is-himself character-
ized by love in its· supreme, or e:µlinent, form, cou,ld serve 
as the proper.opject.of such devotion. In his words: 
"Only supreme love can be supremely lovable. 117 
An important implication of· the foregoing is that . 
religion is not a one-way affair, whereby man relates him-
self to God, but· not vice versa. Hartshorne takes th~ 
religious.sense of God to proclaim him "the Goc;l of love· and 
8 
responsiveness and interaction with man .. " The notions of 
"responsiveness and interaction" are.dominant motifs in all 
of Hartshorne's writings. It,has already been shown, in 
chapter one, how they figure prominently in h~s·social con-. 
ception of reality. Any conception, of.God, then, which 
represents him as c0mpletely aloof. and independent of the 
world, as "wholly other," does not, to Hartshorne's mind, 
deserve to be honorec;l with the adjectiye "religious," The 
relationship between God and his creatures must be a two-
way affair. Hartshorne points out· that "A social being 
receives from others as well as gives ·to them. 119 God is 
not an exception to the social na-i;ure of reality, put is 
rather its su:preme exemplification.· "A personal, G9d," 
Hartshorne declares, "is one·who has social relations, 
36 
really has them, and thus is constituted by relationships~ 
. ' . Since participa~ion and mutual int~rdependence 
between God and cr~ation is what the religious sense re-
quires, apy explication of the religious sense of God must 
take care to employ conc~pts that provide f9r and make ex-
plicit God's responsiveness an~ interaction vis-a~yis,his 
creatures, no less than theirs vis~a-vis him. 
God as t~e Unsurpassable 
Se!f-Surpasser of All 
For God to be the "supremely excellent, being," and so 
"su:perlatively worthy" of our, attention, he must be without 
rival, that is, superior to every oth~r individual, every 
other reality, whether· actual, or possible. 11 To worship 
anything which does not possess this radical superiority 
over a~l other? is idolatrous. Anselm. sought-expression 
fqr tbis requi;rement in the formula: "thou art a being 
than which nothing greater can be con~eived. 1112 This radi-
cal supremacy and excelle~ce promptly gives rise to the 
allied .notions of "unsurpas s ability" and "perfection." 
These.terms serve as a kind of shorthand for the Anselmian 
formula. 13 
Complicating the matter, howev~r, is the fact that 
ther~ are two principal alternative ways of conceiving per~ 
fection and unsurpassability, There are two rival ipter-
pretations of· Anselm's. formulation,. "than which nothing 
greater can be conceiyed." Hartshorne avers that Anselm 
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himself did not:notice this and thereby.spoiled his· insight 
in the course.of working out,his ontological proof for 
God's existence. 14 
Interpreted one way, a perfect, u:p.surpassable being is 
one who is·. "unsurpassable in conception or possibility even 
by itself . 1115 Given such,. a conception of Go<;l, it follows 
th,.at.he is.complete in all dimensions,_immutable, wholly 
actual. All ,that· he can be, he is; hence. it would be 
absurd to speak of the divine reality as becoming better, 
of enjoying any measure of increase in reality or.value. 
Being perfect, on this view, means that no change or in-
crease is-ascribable to deity, for any change in what· is 
maximally complete could only result- in diminished reality 
and value. It· appears that this is the meaning of "none, 
greater", that Anselm had in mind . 16 It. is· also one of the 
distinguishing features of what Hartsh0rne calls "classical 
theism. 1117 According to th,.e c~assical,interpretation, 
Go~'s supremacy and perfection must reside in his secµrity 
from any rival, even himself. in another, albeit better, 
state. .Kaw could the supreme reality surpass itself when 
divine perfection is treated as-betng equivalent to 
"absolutely complet_e"? The c;livine life could not qe 
thought-of.as being anything like a process, a succession 
of states, in which each succeeding state is richer~ quali-
tatively more abundant reality than. its predecessor·. 
However, perfection may also be taken to mean t 1an 
excellence such,. that· rivalry or superiority on, the p~rt of 
other individuals is impossible, but self-superiority is 
not impossible .. 1118 On this view, God cannot, be _surpassed 
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by apy other, nondivine in4ividual, though he can surpass, 
himself. It.differs from the first alternative by assign-
ing an integral role, to the factor of beceming. But note 
that the divine life exemplifies the supreme, unsurpassable 
form of becoming, since it is always in the di~ection of 
increase. What Anselm failed to see, Harts4orne says, is 
that the God who. is perfect, and thus worthy of unqualified 
devotion, should be conceived as. the "self 0surpassing sur-
passer of all. 1119 A reason is suggested· for th.is neglect: 
Anse·lm' s mind. . . was full of the Greek glorifi-
cation of the i~mutable; he accepted the 
Platonic-Aristotelian argument that·what· is. 
worshipful must be self-sufficient and perfect 
in the sense of c0mplete, a:\'].d tha1;: what is com-
plete cannot·ch~nge~-ebviously not 1 for the 
better, and surely not for the worse. Change 
is a sign of-weakness, it was- thought, and its 
only-value must be te re~edy a prior defect.20 
Two alternatives regarding the way inwhich an indi- .. 
vidual may be unsurpass able, or perfect; have now been 
briefly mapped out. Classical theism adheres to a.doctrine 
of strict perfectionism, whereas Bar~shorne 1 s neoclassical 
theism eschews this and opts instead for a. relative .per-
fectionism~ At this point one is close.to the heart,of the 
theism Har~shorne wishes to revise. Cl~ssical theism makes 
central to its conception of deity t~e -aforementioned 
notions of immutability, self-sufficiency and completeness. 
This tradition spoke, of God as unsurpassable in all re-
spects, such that there could be nothing further or 
additiona~ which he might come -- to possess. An~elm, and the 
tradition in-which he stanc;ls, conceives of._ Go~ as _the all-
around maoc:j_mum of· value a:r;id reality, who ac~ually possesses, 
in a- single. eternal a~tuality, every possible dii:nensi<;m of 
value. 21 
In order.to place Professor Har~shorpe~s neoclassical. 
theism i:p.bolder relief; and to-ca).l particu+ar attention 
to its dip9lar aspect, it is helpful to fill out.mqre fully 
the traditional position. It ·will thel\ be ex,plained why he 
argues, in opposition to Anselm, Aquinas and.others-, tt.iat 
when applied to God,_ perfection must me~n unsu:rpassabili ty 
in.some, not.in all, respects. 
Following Aristotle~ Aquinas conceiv~9- qoq. to be "the 
First Being" in wh9_m there is no potehtiali ty or becqm-
ing. 22 God· is act~s purus, pure actuality~ No~ only does, 
God not· possess any pote:q.tial which; is to be, ·subsequently 
actualized; his-actuality is eternal, it ts not, the result 
of any previous - actualizaticm. As -Aquinas puts it: . 
. . . t~is first:being must be pure act, without 
the admixture -of any potentiality, , f~r: tbe -
reason.th,at~ abs9l~t~ly, potentialitycis! 
posterior t'? act. Now eyerything wh1ch is in 
any way changed, is in some way- i:p,. poten1;:i,ali ty. 
Hen~e it is evident that it is impossib~e for 
God to change. in any way~- . . . since Gpd is 
inf:i,hi t~, -comprehending in Himself -all th,e 
plenitu~e of the perfection of all being, He 
cannot acquire.anything new ... ,23 
As pure actuality, God is -- self-sufficient and cpmplete, 
such that no a~dition to the degree of reality or value 
' ' , 
which he possesses is possible, for he p~ssesses all pos-
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sible reality and.value. 
Such a doctrine seems clearly to entail the radical 
and absolute independence of God, even to the extent that 
nondivine beings are in no way constitutive of the divine 
reality. Har:tshorne r~ises a number of objections. against 
this way of. conceiving God, which lead him- to the alterna-
tive notion of a, being who indeed surpasses all other 
beings, but who nonetheless is capable of surpassing him-
self. Of course, such a being will not be the changeless, 
self-sufficient being of whom Aquinas and Anselm speak. 
The first objection is that the idea of a, God who 
creates and possesses all value, independently of others, 
makes the religiow~ injunct~on to serve others .impossible. 
A man serves God.by somehow gen~inely contributing to the 
life of God~ Yet\ if God is in eternal possession of all 
possible value, there would: seem to be nothtng men could 
offer him. That God possesses all va~ue in a single state 
of. actuality seems to imply that nondivine individuals do 
not have the opportunity of creating any value ourselves, 
and thus they would have nothing to contribute. Or, if 
they did create anything, it would be a superfluous.addi-
tion to the divine possession. "The idea of a God so per,,-
fect that he eternally realizes all possible values," 
Har:tshor:p.e argues, "is fatal to religion, for it makes 
human choice of no significance whatsoever. Infinite value 
will exist no matter what we do. 112 4 
The second, objection is on philosophical grounds, and 
utilizes the Leibnizian .notion of "incompossible values,'' 
the doctrine·that·there cannot be in actuality the simul-
taneous co-existence of.all possible values, since there 
are some values which ar~ incompatible, and thus mutually 
exclusive of each other. In.illustration of· this princi~ 
ple, Hartshorne writes: 
Being a. scientist is good, being a musician is. 
good., but. the same man cannot. in the. fullest 
sense be both. Sonnets have many possible rhyme 
schemes, each of which is good, but each of 
which in a given case excludes all others~ This 
conflict of positive values is at th~ root of 
both contingency and tragedy in existence. Be-
tween positive values there can be no uniquely 
right choice. And always some goods. must be 
renounced.ZS 
Inasmuch as all possible values cannot e~ist in one 
eternal state of actuaiity, such a notion.should not be 
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correlated with that of perfection, Rather, perfection 
should be thought of as "partly 9,ynamic. 1126 Sine~ "a 
purely final or static perfection possessing all possible 
value is impossible, 1127 value must come into being, must be 
created, must become" To Hartshorne's mind, the doctrine 
of. a being conceived as an absolute, all-around maximum of 
value is no more.meaningfµl than the confused notions.of a 
"greatest possible number," or of a "greatest possible mag-· 
ni tude, 11 2 8 Even God's appropriation of value and reality 
must come in successive increments. 
But if God is not conceivable as the actuai possessor 
of all possible value and reality, how is he to be con-
ceived? Recall that the meaning of "perfection" to which 
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Hartshorne adheres is that of unsurpassability by anoth~r, 
though not by self. It was seen that God may be.conceiveq 
as surpassable by himself (though by no other being) should 
he pass to a higher, richer· state. This conception of God 
admit~ and affirms an element of becoming, hence change and 
potentiality, in.the divine reality~ Yet it must not be 
forgotten that _there is a dimension of unsurpassability 
present also, for all others are inferior to God, In this 
sense, God-is indeed absolute~ 
The self-surpassing being who surpasses all others 
is, in certain respects, strictly absolute. It 
can be shown to be inde~endent of other beings, 
at least for its retention of values already.at~ 
t~ined and for its assurance of surpassing other_ 
beings~ actual or possible; it is also at·an 
absolute maximum in this, that there can be no 
more universal superiority to others than super-
iority to all others.29 
Professor Hartshorne finds an element of validity in 
the idea that- God must_ be, in some· respects, abs0lute and 
immutable, "beyond shadow of turning."- Yet he is equally 
convinced that this cannot be the whole truth about God. 
It must somehow be the case that the eminent reality is 
both being and becoming. In this regard, it is affirmed: 
that 
• o • 'God, ' not-_ in -any extraordinary sense, but 
as the term occurs in_ ordinary piety, refers .to 
a being conceived as having two aspects: an-
abstract, eternal nature which is strictly ne-
cessary, and a-total, de facto actuality, con-. 
taining both the eternal nature and successive 
accidental qu~lities.30 
Classical thinkers were acting on tbe basis of a sound in-
tuition insofar as they maintained that _God must somehow be 
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untouched by chaJ:ige and independent of the fqrtunes -of the 
world. Their mistake, so Hartshor:p.e arguesl lies in the 
manner in wh~ch tli.ey construe t}ie "someh~w. 11 
Formally, there are three possible solutions h~re: 
(1) God is in all respects immutable, absolute, actual, 
necessary; or (2) God is in no respects immutable, abso-
lute, actua+, necessary; and (3) God is in some respects 
immutable, absolute, actual, neces~ary, and in some (other) 
respects mutable, relative, potential, contingent. 31 The 
traditional approach is to select the first alternati.ve, to 
the exclusion of (2) and (3), which.are held to be defec-
tive modes. of existing. (2) of course is incompatible· with. 
the superiqrity allegedly ~ef~nitive of deity. A being who. 
did not, exist necessarily could pot. qualify as "that than. 
which none greater.can be conceived.". For a.being who did 
e~ist necessarily, whose existence was secure beyond even 
the con<;:ei val?ili ty of.non-existence, would be superior to a 
being who did notex~st :p.ecessarily, but· only as .a chan~e 
result of favorable .. factors supportive of its existence. 
Hartshorpe selects (3) as ·the most adequate characteriza-
tion. To this doctrine that God is both surpass able and. 
unsurpassable, though each in different respects, he gives 
the name·"dipolar theism." This label is highly signifi-
cant, for it clearly calls at~ention to. two aspects, or 
"poles," of God's nature: unsurpassabili ty by oth~rs and 
surpassability .by.self. Conceiving God· to be,dipolar in 
nature allows Har:tshorne t~ effect an attractive synthesis. 
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of seemingly conflicting factors; thus, God is both infin-
i te, immutable and atemporal; and he is finite, mutable·. and 
temporal, Or again, both being and becomiµg apply to God. 
However, to avoid contradiction, the two poles must 
apply. in such a way . as not to conflict with each other .. 
The respect in which God is immutable, for.instance, cannot 
without contradiction be the respect in which he is mu~ 
table. Dipolar theism is Hartshorne' s proposed solution to 
the problem of how both being and becoming can characterize 
God. 
Monopolar and Dipolar Theism 
At this point, it is useful to contrast the dipolar 
method of describing deity with its .counterpart, the mono-
polar met~od. It may be summarized as follows: 
... taking each pair of ultimate contraries, 
such as one and many, permanence and change, 
being and becoming, necessity and cpntingency, 
th~ self~sufficient or nonrelative vers~s .the 
dependent or relative, the actual versus the 
potential, one decides in each case which mem-
ber of the pair is good or. admirable and then. 
attributes it (in some supremely excellent or 
transcendent fprm) to deity, while wholly 
denying the contrasting term. What we pro-
pose to call 'classical theism' is, in the 
West, the chief product of this methodi in the 
Orient its chief product is pantheism.~2 
Ultimate contraries are represented as forming pairs 
which are polar in nature, each term of the contrasting 
pair corre~ponding to .. a different. pole. In monopolar 
theism, only one of the contrasting terms is admitted as 
applicable to God. The other term is excluded as being 
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essentially defective and inferior. This method results in 
I . 
a being conceived as-wholly absolute.and wholly actual, a 
being unaffected by the passage of time, thus existing in 
an eternal present and knowing all things in. a nonsuc-
cessive, single act of s:ognition. The monopolar God is.ab-
solutely simple, without ''parts" or constituents of.any 
sort, devoid of internal succ;~ssion. of. "statesn (for ex-
ample, in th,.e sense of enjoying or experiencing "moments" 
of happiness). Contrariwis~, the application .of such cate-
gories as temporality, complexity, an4 potentiality is re-
garded by this method. as improper.. The eminent reality can 
b~ described, it is thus argued, ·on~y by utilizing the 
allegedly superior pole of ultimate contrasts. 
frofessor Hartshorne is critical of this method on. 
two f~onts. First, he maintains, on logical grounds, that 
the one-sided and exclusive affirmation.of but one. of the 
terms .in. ultimate contraries tends to deprive that affirm-
ation of·meaning. The case of unity is offered in illus-. 
tration of this pqi:p.t. In the case of unity, it is pointed· 
out that unity is always of something, and thus for there 
to b~ unity there must also be constituents that are 
unified. Unity and complexity are thus-notions that are 
"essentially correlat~ye. 1133 The same is .true for the 
other pairs of contraries. Thus, if one affirms th,.e ap-
plicability of one of the ter~s, yet. at.the same time 
denies the applicability of its contrasting term, the re-. 
sult is that·the affirmation.loses its:meaning. 
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The second objection Hartshorne levels .at the mono-
polar method of conceiving God involves an appeal to exper-
ience. Here he finds that "experience does not.· .. exhibit 
the implied essential inferiority of the theologically 
despised contraries. 1134 For instance, it is true that 
things are sqmetimes found to be defective and inferior 
owing to a complexity insufficiently unified. Yet, sheer 
unity is.no facile protection against inferiority, for a 
unity lacking in sufficient complexity is trivial and mon-
otonous. When comp le xi ty predominates ~>Ver unity the re- . 
sult is ·Chaos; when unity predominates 9ver complexity, we 
encounter monotony. But both extremes represent defective 
modes and con~equently both are to be avoided, so that· a 
balanced richness, "unity-in-variety, or variety-in-unity" 
is achieved. 35 In.other words, it is monopolarity in 
either direction, yielding sheer complexity or. sheer unity~ 
that is normally judged inferior and defective. Conceiving 
God as simple, without constituents, would therefore run 
counter. to "the good as we know it, 1136 which is a balance, 
or harmony, between the formally contrasting extremes. The 
monopolar conception, Hartshorne insists, compels the com-
promising of these basic.principl~s. 
Hartshorne proposes the following correction of the 
monopolar method: 
There seems a good deal of support, in experience, 
logic.and intellectual history for what Morris 
Cohen· cailed the 'Law of Polarity.' According to 
this law, ultimate contraries are correlatives, 
mutually interdependent, so that nothing real can 
be d~scribed by th~ 'holly one-sided assertion of 
simplicity, being, ·actuality, and the like, each 
in a. 'pure' form~ deyoid and independent of com:-
ple~it~, becoming, pbtentiality, and related con~ 
traries.~7 
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Accordingly~ Hartshorne'~ dipolar method of conceiving deity 
claims to avoid the mistake.made by cl!issical tJ:i.eists··using 
t}:ie monopolar method, by affirming, rath,er. than denying~ 
"certain all-pervasive, infinitely fundamental aspects .of. 
life- -change, variety :t complexity, receptivity, sympathy, 
suffering, memory, an~icipation--as relevant.to the idea of 
God; 1138 
But Hartshorne's dipelar method of characterizing God 
rests upon a ~ore fundamental· contrast, that b,etween the 
at>s tract and the conc;:ret~. Th~ t is to say J there is an ab-· 
stract aspect of God's nature, as well as a concrete as-
pect. One set of terms; for instance· "being," "abso.lute, u 
11neceSS ary 1 ii 11 infini te 1 II, 11nOn temporal 1.1 belong together as 
c0rrelative to the abst.ract pole of the divine nature; and 
another set of terms, contrasts with the .. first set, for 
instance, ''becoming·· "-"relative " "contingent tt llfinite u 
. . ' ' .. ·'' ,, ~ ' , ' 
11 temporal"--all. of these· belopg t0gether as correlative to 
the concrete pole. Thus, Har~shorne can·meet the charge of 
contradiction by pointing out that he ~oes not hold, God to 
be both necessary and contingent in the same respect. 
RatherJ God is-held to be· necessary in one\ respect (the 
abstract aspect) and contingent in a different respect (the 
concrete aspect). 
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God as Goncrete 
Baldly stated, God in h~s-concrete aspect is the 
world., or universe, in.all of its .extraordinary, mu+tifari-. 
ous richness,, detail and variety. Yet~ it must be remem-
bered that. Harts.horne ·thinks of the world not a.s a. mere. 
collection or aggregate, but rather as an organicwhole 
possessing unity oL e:.>eperience. Consequen1:ly, "The crea-
tion is not· just a set· of creatures, it.is .somehow one, 
creature, and.its Ul'.li ty. is, in some fashion, ide~l or 
spiritua+. 1139 This parallels·the account offered in the 
first chapter, in which God is held to be a society of ac-
tual occasions, each of which is characterize~ by a synthe-
sis of previous occasions. 40 Moreover, God, in contrast.to 
every other. individual, has the entire world as data to be 
synthesized. The worlQ. is .. constan~ly becoming, is continu:-
ally being made anew. It pul.ses anQ. expands, inc;:reasing in .. 
content, yet remaining always an in1:egrated, organic,wh,ole. 
Accordingly, God, whq is t4e world in its.cosmic, holistic 
unity and functional integration, is continually becoming, 
"creating each. new state in the worl~ process .. 11 41 
It should be c~ear from the foregoing consi&erations 
that· the ~dentification of the concrete_aspec.t of· God with 
the universe does not imply that· God is "merely physical" 
if that phrase is taken to mean.insentiate; dead, or un-
feeling. God· is physical-in the sense that he ipclu4es 
within himself all physical reality. "Physi~al reality,"· 
• 
however, is not simply synonymous with."mere matter". for 
psychicalism is ·held to be the fundamental truth about .. 
reality. 42 
To speak of the concrete aspect of God, then, is t9 
draw attention to the exper~ential aspect 9f his-nature. 
The unity of the world in God: is a felt unity, an experi-
e11ced oneness. In its. concrete .. aspect; reality is .. an 
"ocean of feelings 1143 which are, in turn, felt by God. 
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This means.that God is not1 an exception to, but the supreme 
illustration of, the social character of reality. For to 
feel is essentially to respond, and responsiveness to 
others is sociality. "God " Hartshorne avers "is a so-' . . . . ' 
cially receptive being, ~aking upon himself the very being 
of. others. 1144 God.' s awareness is a responsive inte-
gration. of· the awareness of others, indeed of all others, 
since all are in him. 
Viewing God's relation to the world irt this light, 
Hartshor11e is able _to say that God creates himself out of 
the creatures he includes. That is to say, God and his 
creation are not wholly distincto Hartshorne can thus find 
common ground with Ikhnaton, who, in the twelfth century be-
fore Christ, composed a hymn of praise. to the God "who him-, 
self fashioned himself. 114 5 These words compare favorably 
with Ha:rtshorne 's own way of expressing the. relation be-
tween creator and creation: "God, in creating the world, 
creates a new tot~l reality which is Himself as tenrichedt 
by the world (Berdyaev's term). 11 46 
so 
God fashions his own,experien~es out 1 of·the experiences 
of other?. Th~ many experie:Q.ces of the creatures are data 
to b~ synthesized into, the one·experience. ef the creater; 
since God couid haye no.experiences whatsoever with.9ut,data 
to. experience., and since God· includes. within· himself all 
things, it may: be said that God creates his own experiences 
out,of that-wh~ch is intE;lgral te him. The world is not~a 
reality external. to God, but a re~lity internal to him~ In 
making the world what it is, through successive cre,tive-, 
synthe$es, God makes himself what he is. As -such; God is 
dependent, not independent, upon the world for his own.ac: 
t1:1ality~ God· apart frem a world to know, feel, direct, 
could be nothing more.than a mere abstraction~ 47 
Furthermore• with r~gard to the concrete di~ension of 
his nature, God; is. _not e!l ti rely simple t but also complex. 
In the sense outli:r;i.ed in chapter one, God is both one_ and 
many. 48 Or, as Hartshorne has it, God "is the many as also 
one, or the one· as also many. The worl~ as not ·God is t~e 
many merely as many--an ab~traction from the many as ·one, 
as the integrated, ac'f;:~ve-passive;content of omniscience.u49. 
The a:µalogy Ha-rtshorne most. often emplpys .. to explain 
the concrete nature of._ deity: is that of mind and body. This 
is why he· can speak of i•the. ci;:>smos as the perpetually re-
newed, body of God. uSO In other. words, in. certain important 
respects, God1is to the world as~a man· is.to his body. The 
wor·ld, taken as a plurality of less than- divine items U'tl).e 
m~ny ·merely as -many") constitutes the body· of· God;. God 
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taken as -the all-inclu~ive integrati,.ve being ("the m·any as 
also one•·'), is the mind, er seul, of the werld. 51 
Hartshorne believes that the key to the.mind-bedy 
relation is to see, it as a relation between 1 the one· and the. 
many, instead of· a one-to-one relation:· "There is· really 
no. possibili~y of really comprehending how 'the mind' in-. -. 
fluences 'the .body' and vtce y~rsa. uSZ The mind, as -cor- · 
related to the human personality, is an integrative agency, 
influencing and being influenced by, successive changes in 
the body cells. Yet 1•1 11 always .experience such interaction 
with this many as a.felt.unity or oneness. AnQ. everi·tho"Ugh 
the relationship between mind and body is a sym~etrical 
one, involving mutual interaction arid influence, th.e mind 
is still the dominant member. "The body as.,a whole~ as a· 
dynamic individual unit (net a, collection) or--it is the· 
same thing--as amind; wills: the parts of the body, 
(which may be m~nds . , but.-.not that mind) respond. u 53 
Extending this accoµnt t:e the.divine case, Harts.,. 
horn~ conceives God as. the cosmic mind whose body is.the 
entir~ cosmos. The mutua:j. influenc;:e between mind and body. 
which is pr~sent in the human; case.is also present in the 
divine case. God is not impassive tqwards the world; on 
the cpntrary, he .is-not enly open to, but requires, its 
influence. 
experience. 
Without some world, God would have n9thtng to 
Hartshorne is adamant that God cannet be con-· 
' , . ' ~. . ' 
cei ved as· disembodied mind.· At, the same t~me, the cosmic 
or di vine mind exerts the dominant· (yet. not monopolistic) . 
influence on all other inflµences, to the degree that it 
sets limits to the freedom of lesser beings. 
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Sue~ an analogy prompts interesting questions as to 
how far the similarities with the human case may reasonably 
be expected to extend. The principal dissimilarities be-
twee~ the divine case and any non-divine case· are the 
following: 
First, God is supremely receptive to influence by 
others. This means that he is open to direct influence by 
all others. 54 Deity is not to.be conceived as a mere frag-
ment of reality, but rather as the all-inclusive.reality. 
God, in contrast· to every other thing, has no external en-
vironment; all things are·his internal constituents. Since 
Hartshorne holds that to know something adequately is to 
include it, 55 God must have the supremely adequate form of· 
knowledge. That is, only God could know all things because 
only he includes all items available to know. Contrasting 
the human with the divine mode of knowing, Hartshorne 
writes: 
Granted that we do not 'include' mountains when 
we. ,·know'' them, uµless. in some very attenuated 
sense of include, equally we do not knqw moun-
tains, except in a very attenuated sense of 
'know·' - -by comparison with what the word means 
when we say that God knows.mountains.· ... 
Furthermore, whenever our.knowledge achieves 
somethirig like infallibility, it also bec6mes 
evident that it includes the known within it-
self. Thus we know, in a sense infallibly, the 
aches and pains we directly feel. Do we not 
also include these.feelings? Are they not 
features of our· consciousness at tbe moment?S6 . . ' 
Second, although Hartshorne .does conceive God as 
cosmic mind, he does not claim that there is a cosmic 
brain, a localized organ an,alogous to its human counter-
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part; God as co~mic mind is suffused throughout 1 the uni-
verse, "co-extensive with,existence, 1157 and hence ''in" all 
things. The world thus conceived is something like a vast 
nervous system, with every creature, every item of reality, 
. 11 . h d" , . d 58 I d d serving as a nerve ce 1n t e 1v1ne min . · n ee , on 
this view, it would be more accurate to say.that, in the 
divine ,case, mind and body, are coincident. Th~y are coin-
cident in the sense that~ everywher~ the world-body-is~ 
there also is the world-mind. In elaboration of this view, 
Hartshorne says, 
For.such a mind mus~ have, not a world-part as· 
brain, but the whole world serving as higher 
equivalent of a.brain; so that just as .between a 
brain cell and th,e human mind there is no further 
mechanism, so between every individual. in exist-
ence and the world-mind there is no chain of in-
termediaries, not even a.nervous system, but each 
and. everyone. is· in the di re ct grip of the world-
value. 59 · 
Thus, he can also say that God's mode of kn,owing, or aware-
ness, should be conceived "as clear intuition of the entire 
cosmos. 1160 
Third, God's mode of knowing, as t~e immediately pre-
ceding quotation indicates, is characterized by intuitive 
clarity. Bartshorne argues that every non-divine case of 
knowing or awareness involves selectivity among data pres-
ent and available for that particular act of awareness. 
The creatures "screen out1' or abstract from the wealth of· 
detail, so that not every aspect of the item known is 
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included and present to their. consciousness. Nondivine in-
dividuals do not,,. in kl).owing, "take everythi!1-g in.'', Ac-
cording to Ha~tshorne, this is true even of 0ur,own interior 
states, and even more true of our awareness of external 
states of affairs. lie points out, that "Wit~ perception of 
things outside the body, there seems no good reason for 
supposing a direct grasp (unless a very faint and ineffec-
tual one) of the things we see or hear. 1161 There are thus 
always some. negative aspects in our, manner of knowing 
things, in~smuch as there are, always· some· excludecl featur~s 
in. each act of knowing. 
In contrast, there are no negative aspects in God's 
mode1of knowing. Literally, whatever ther~ is tG know, 
wh~tever is actu~l, God knows it, withou~ distortion, 
. l" 62 vagueness, or part+a ity. 
Fourth, the divine instance of the min~-body relation 
is not subject to decay or~ dissolu~ion. This of course is 
not the case for lesser minds and bodies, and this has·been 
one of the reasons adduced for th.e inappropriateness of 
ascribing a body to deity. If bodies are· intrinsically 
subject to decay, su{ely the divine reality is not em- .. 
bodied! However, God is unique in that he alone,is·not one, 
body.among other· bodies. He alone 1 has no external environ-
ment on which he· must depend for his continued existence. 
In an intr,iguing piece of reasoning~ Professor Hartshorne 
puts his case thus~ 
True it is that bodies preserve themselves by 
developing new parts from time to time,, to re~ 
place those that have disintegrated; but, for the 
body as a whole to survive it is only necessary 
that the one process keep pace with the other. 
Now the fact that all bodies less than the uni-
verse seem eventually to'fail to maint~in such a 
balance is not inconsistent.with.the notion that 
the universe 1.tself d<;>es maint!lin it, To have an 
external environment.is to depend upon factors 
not under immediate control, and sooner or later 
these factors may happen to conflict fatally with, 
one's internal needs. But the universe as a 
whole, if.it is.· an organism at all, must immedi-
ately control all its parts; so what is to pre-
vent it from setting unsurpassable limits to 
disintegration in relation to construction? 
... The composition involves mutability; but the. 
unity sets li~its to mutiibility which make.cor-. 
ruption of the whole impossible.63 · 
SS 
According to the foregoing yiew, God may be described, 
on one side of his· nature, as the supreme instance or form 
of becoming. God is divine becpming, the cumulative "crea-
tive advance" of the cosmos. In his concrete aspect, God 
is the individual who is .. surpass able only by himself, who 
indeed is always surpassing himself. 
God as Abstract 
Thus far Hartshorne's conception of God as a concrete 
individual, as a personal.being who has relations with the 
world, has been.considered. Does this mean that they are 
simply wrong who: maintain that God is not a being or a· 
spirit, but rather being itself, or spirit itself? Harts-
horne acknowledges that there is some substance to this 
query. Even on his view, God· must not be conceived merely 
as a being, but also, he must somehow be conceived as being 
itself. "His uniqueness must consist precisely in being 
56 
both.reality as su~h and indivi4ual reality, insofar com-. 
parable to other i~dividuals, 1164 In other, word:s, deity 
must somehow be .an exception t<;> the general rule th,at "what" 
is indiviq.ual is not, to an·equal degree, uriiversal, and 
what i$ universal is not to an equal degree individua1. 1165 
God must be a· radically unique ind:lvidual~ an.individ-
ual who .. is· also th~ very principle o:f. existence. 
This is exactly the point of theism: that .the 
u:). timate principle .,is· individual, not, a mere or 
universal form,, pattern., system, matt~r, or 
force--or that~ conversely, the ultimate indi-
vidual is strictly universal in its ,scope or 
relevance. 66 · · · 
That is to say, God alone is the.individual who exempli.fies, 
universal charact~ristics~ His very.existence, for ex-
ample, is absolutely secure; no state of affairs could be 
incom~atible with:the d~vine ex:i,.stence, hence God is the 
sole necessarily e~isting being. He alone, is eternal--
unborn and uncilying. He· al.one surpasses all other individ-
uals, and alone is u:r;i.ive~salin his sphere of influence and 
interaction~ 
All of these stipu1ations serve to identify deity with 
such notions· as ·!'grouncil of being,". "reality. as such,"- and 
"l;>eing qua 'being." But these are all. abs ti: act principles. 
They are indeterminate inasmuch as they 40 not,single.out 
a:r:iy particular stat~ of affairs. Rather, they are princi-
ples of· such ge11erali ty that .they are common te a:j.l states 
of affairs, an,d must 't;herein, be exemplified. Reaching for 
an analogy, Hartshorne once again turns to the . human case, 
57 
and suggests that those.personality traits whic~ se~ve to 
characterize an indi yi~ual may. be seen as,. aqstpact an.d 
"highly specific universals of whic;:h each momentary state 
of t~e man is a_,new insta:p.ce or embodiment. 1167 The dif-
ference 9etwee:p..the h~man, and divine case is t~at in the 
latter the "personality traits"· are the very principles 1of 
existence. For example, tl;i.e di vine may be characterized 
both by being and becoming, for the reason tha~ qecoming 
is. That· is~ becoming d,oes not itself become\or emerge: 
"It simply is) wit:Q.out.alternatiye. 1168 
This aspect of God's nature is.the generic aspect, 
signifying what· God is bound to be, those characteristics 
which he is bound to exemplify by.virt1,1e of.being the un-
surpassab.le yet self-surpassing individual. Hartshorne is 
as convinced as the classical thinkers.that. God must be, in 
some.suitable way, immu;table, necessary, in:dependent, atem-
poral, infinite, et cetera. But he is.equally convinced 
that this cannot·be the whole,trutl). about· God.· If it were, 
God would indeed be merely an abstraction; in the same way 
tl).at personality traits, or ge:p.eric features (e .. g., "hu-
manity") are abs tractions. 
Eternally fix~d, immune to influence., and, incapa-
ble of increase is only the generic divi~e trait 
of universal interaction, u:p.surpassable in scope 
and adequacy--just what is properly meant·by 
calling God 'ail-knowing,', 'all.,.powerful '·' 
'ubiquitous,'. also unborn· and immortal. These 
abstractions come to the· same thing. But they 
are empty by themselves. It is ·vain· to interact 
universally an4 always, but with nonentity,, or. 
to have unsurpassable knowledge, but. of no other 
individual than self. But this empti.ness is 
precisely what classical theism spoke of as Go~ 
when, it· declared him absolute.ly and i:p. all re -
spects immutable and independent of the.world.69 
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The abstract features of deity tQgether form th~ divine es-
sence; the concrete f~atur~s cons~itute the.divine acci-
dents.in which the abstrat~~ generic, essential aspects are 
exemplified, 
Anothe:r way· of elucid!ilting the. abstract;concrete 
cc:mtrast is by way .. of. still another .c<:>ntra~t, n~pnely that 
between.existence and act~ality. That ,God. ~xis ts, is. --. ·~.: ,,
eternal, all-knowing, sup;remely powerful, i$ .a necessary· 
and timeles~ truth, in~ependeiit of· any par~icular worlcl to. 
which. God is related, Yet, just how he ex~mip,+ifie.s th.is 
truth, in exactly.what. concrete state of ac~~~lity, is not 
necessary, nor in~ependent of the world;. ~<l~.'s ct;mcrete 
actuality depends on the particular~ concre~tj wbrld he pos-
sesses as items in.his experience. Unfail,i~~ly, he.will 
' ' 
possess whatever world ther~ happens. to be7" -and jus-t; this 
is h~s abstract j n~ces~ ary characteristic. Ged 1 s .. person-
ality traits are unfailingly.manifested in concrete.states. 
These personality traits are identical with the divine es-
sence, and consequently th.ey are·necessary and fixed. The 
c~mcrete states in which. they are e~emplified are contin-
gent, and are not require~ by Gbd's essence,. All that is 
required is. that they be. actualized in,sbme·cbncrete·state. 
In expliq1.tion of ~his v:i,.ew, Hartshor:p.e says 
Let us call the concrete state of a t~t~g its 
ac~uality. T~en my pr6position is, actbility 
is·. always more than bare existence. Il~·iftence 
is that the defined abstract nature is somehow 
concretely actuaiized; but how it i~ actuali~ed, 
in what particular stat~, with what particular 
content not· deducible from the abstract·defini-
ti9n con~tit~tes the actuality.70 - · 
The Relation Between the Abstract 
and Concrete Aspects-of God 
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At this point the question arises as to ho~ the ab-
stract aspect is .related to the concre~e aspect. Are they, 
for instance, to be thought of as rather like two sides.of 
the same co in? . The r~ is perhaps · a tendency to so conceive 
the relation~ This would nonetheless be a misconception. 
The answer has been implicit in the preceding discussion. 
Hartshorne reiterates throughout his wr;i. tings ·that· "the 
concrete includes the abstract. 1171 Acc:erdingly, 
The concrete is the inclusive form of, reality, 
from _which the abstract. is an abstracted aspect 
or constituent. Again, the concrete is the.def-
inite, for to abstract from d~tails or. asuects 
is, insofar, to conceive .the indefi~ite.72 
Concrete. instances. ef becoming thus are· richer than 
the abstract, generic princ~ples or characteristics-they 
include and exemplify. To use a Hartsh,ornean example: an 
individual may exemplify or. ma:r:iife~ t friengship- -but a. 
friend is concrete, whereas -"friendship'' is an abstrac-
tion. 73 Still, the two aspects, the friend an~ his dis-
played friendliness, are somehow one thing· together·. So 
also with Go~; his concreteness.includes his abstractness 
and forms one reality. l'here fore, in his total :reality 
God is neither· being as contrasted to becqming 
nor becoming as contrasted to being; but categor~ 
ically supreme becomirig in which there is~a fac-
t0r of categorically supreme being, as contrasted 
to inferior becomillg inwhic:P, there is .inferior 
being.74 
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In th~s-way God furni?hes the sole.example of what Profes-
sor Hartshorne calls "dual trans cen~ence, v ·or the doctrine 
that.God is unsurpassable in two dimensions: the a'bstract, 
necessary· dimension alld the concrete, contingent"dimen-
sion.75 
The abstract~concrete distinction provides.a fruitful 
COI1text within which to COJ:\Sider the "religious· availabil-
ity" of Hartshorne 's dipolar God. Sur~ly much of the. at-
t~~tion Hartshorne has attracted is owing to his persistent 
effort.;; to artic\llate a theism whic4 serves both.philosophic 
and religious pur.poses. I~ may be. that it is mbre fruitful 
for some purposes to focqs primary attention.on th, more 
abstract features of reality; thus philosophy seeks prin-
ciples of explanation, categoreal schemes. by which tQ in-, 
terpret diyerse featur~s of.experiepce. The abstr~ct· 
aspect. of· the di vine nat~r~ may serve this function. It. is · 
perhaps with this in JI).inq that Hartshorne refers ~o God· as 
f 
"the suprejllE)ly beautiful ~bstract. idea .. 1176 
' . i 
; 
At t~~ saJI).e time~ ~~rtshorne maintains tha~ 4ipolar 
. J 
theism is. capable of expiaining how God as "suprertteiy beaµ-
tiful al;>stract idea". is. cqmpatible with God as Person~ 
Arguing t1'at a.personal God must signify an individual 
' ~ ; 
whose chara.cter is maniff;ls.ted in the act:j.. vi ties cf J.<.nhwl-., 
edge, choipe, an~ love, ijartshorne, in speaking t~ the 
. : : ·~ 
61 
issue of, the reli~ious ayailability of. his doctrine of Gad, 
adds the fallewing: 
God 'shar~s with each cr~ature its actµal world'; 
he takes into his actuality, as 'con~equent' · 
upon-process, the l~fe of the.world, sqmewhat- as· 
we (in infinit~ly less adequate fashion) take 
into ourselves•. experiences of our, friends. He 
does not plot it all out in eternity, and with a 
single moveless state register the result~ ~e 
lives, genuinely lives, i~ unison. with our liv-
ing, and the only mov~less feature is th~ basic 
character of infallibility of,knowing, perfection 
of love or cherishing, ad~quacy of eternal ideal 
or purpose~ Character in Gqd, it:is true, does 
~ot_have to emerge, ~annot improve o~-degenerate, 
and cannotii~ his acts be v~olated, but i$ fi~ed 
and bin.ding, so that neyer-will.nor could.he act 
out: of character. But since_ being 'in character'· 
is th,e mere common.. denominator of all the· acts, 
it c~~~ot involve _what is peculiar to any of 
them, . 
God 1 s character th~s corresponds t0 the abstract pole of_ 
his nature, his acts to t4e concrete pole. It is with tbe 
concrete side of God that we interac;:t '· a~4 that is ft,mda-
mentally important' for the religious dimensions of our. 
lives. 
God as concrete is the one who is.supreip.ely open to 
influence~ and. all experiences are contributions-to the 
divine experience. As -Hartshorne puts.it, "Any eip.otions of 
~eaµty a~d joy whi~h God enables us to have, bec;:9~e ele-
ments in his own, all-embracing experienqe 1 contributory.to 
the richness. of tl:iat experience. 11 78 But. there is more tG 
it than this. The experiences which God has are retained; 
their actuality is preserved in.the divine memory, never to 
be forgotten. In this sense, the divine life may be de-. 
scribed as the. supreme reposi t©ry of experience, Thus, if 
62 
our experiences go to makce up God's experiences'· and God ts 
experien<;:es l once. he has the:qi,. are imm9rtal, it. becomes 
possible to speak of our own immortality. 
This· is a doc;trine of "social immortality, 11 'Qut with 
an added dimensien~ It is social inasmuch as it involves 
the awareness of our endeavors and experiences by another. 
Yet·the one, who is aware and who.remembers us is not 1 char-. ' . . ' ' . . 
acterized by the defective, fallible awareness which goes 
with ~eing human. Human posterity, Har~shorne argues, is 
a poor repository for just this reason. One's fellows :qiay 
not adequately appreciate his life; anQ. even.if, they do 
care, and attempt to preserve h~m in memory; the steady 
passage of time seems· always t!) diminish the remembrance., 
to the point th.at he is, to posterity, only. a fraction of 
what he once really was~ The individual fades and per-
ishes, even in. the memories of tkose who love him most. 
But 
He to.whom all h~arts are open· remains evermore 
open to any. heart that has .ever bee11. apparent ... to 
Him. What· we once were to Him, less than that· we 
can never be, for otherwise He Himself .. as knowing 
us would. lose.something of His own reality~ ... 
Death cannot mean the destruc;tion, or.even.the 
fading~ of the book of one~s life; it can mean. 
only the fixing of its conclu~ing page. Death· 
writes .. 'The . End 1 · upon. the l~s t page, but nothing 
further happens.to the book, by way of either 
addit~on or subtractien.79 
For Hartshorne, this is precisely .. what religious 
availability comes to, namely that 111 religion'·. means the 
highest form of love between· God and·.man whereby O\J.T pass - · 
ing lives ·achieve everlasting value ... 11 SO God is 
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indeed the supremely beaµtiful abstraction, the principle 
cif.principles. But he is also much.more than this· in his 
t@tal reality•· and thus is no· mere abstraction. Whitehead's 
' ' ' . 
final word, in P,rocess and Reality, may also serve as tli,e 
final word in H~rtshorne's own view, to wit~ that although 
our endeavors seem to fade and perish, they ''live for ever-
more~·81 in the ever,...expanding, perfectly retentive, life 
of God. 
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The exposition of Charles Hart!jihOrpe's .concept of Go9-· 
has been c;:ompleted. It is an inspiring and provocativ.e 
picture of reality which he paints, a "scheme of things .. 
entire" in which God and creation are seen to be jointly 
engaged in the process of creati9n. Hartshorpe~s view of 
divinity is.so comprehensive, and presented with.such. con-. 
fidence ap.d argumentative force, that~ given a basic sympa-
thy with theistic concerns; there is a tende~cy for one t0 
be swe·pt away by~ his vision. 
Mere· laudatory remarks; however, would be out of 
keeping with Prpfessor Hartshorn~'s own observation tha; 
critical attention to his thought has been wan~ing. 1 Sev-
eral problems arise for a theism constructed along process 
lines, an4 some of these.will now be explored. No atte111pt 
is made to provide solutions to these proble~s; That is a 
matter for ap.other study. Every philosophy which deals 
with questions of broad scope· and high generality seems·to 
have, at certain crucial points, weaknesses .and inade-
quacies. It is exceedingly difficult for one indiviclual to 
"get it all right," or even to put sound insigh,ts into 
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adequate language. The critical remarks in this chapter 
will have served a useful purpose if they suc~eed in uncov-. 
ering some important problematic aspects of Hartshorne's 
theism, and if they do .. so in, such a way as to stimulate re-
newed investigation into the meaning and import of the pro-
cess concept of God. 
The Divine Simultan~ity 
One of the trickiest problems for Hartshorne 1 s.theism 
concerns the possibility of a divine present or cosmic si.,. 
multaneity. Like all other experient occasions,. God enjoys· 
unity of experience in each new moment of his awareness; 
also there is not just one moment in God's.awareness, but a 
succession .of· them. This implies that God has _a past, a 
present, and a future; th~se di visions,. accordingly, have 
reference to a cosmic past, a cosmic present, and a cosmic 
future. On this view, the cosmic present must somehow be 
interpreted as dividing the.cosmic past from the cosmic 
future. Conceiving God as having unity of exper-ience in 
the way Hartshorne does (that is, as successive unities of 
experience) seems to imply- that. ther~ is a uniquely right 
perspectivej cutting th~ough the universe at each moment in 
the world process. The problem comes to this: taking into 
account the idea of the relativity of all temporal (and 
spatial) perspe·cti ves, which. rel a ti vi ty physics apparently 
insists upon~ how is it possible to speak of an all-
embracing cosmic present? And, if it is not poss,ible, how 
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could there be a division between past cosmic process .and 
future cosmic process? A cosmic present seems necessary 
for the contrast. 
Put another way, physical relativity makes it diffi-
cult to speak of "God now", as opposed to "God a. few moments· 
ago," for the contrast assumes a unique, simultan~ous -pres-
ent which embraces, or sums.up, the entire cosmos'at that 
particular moment. The problem involves finding a meaning 
for the phrase "at that particular moment" when it is :ap-
plied to the universe as a whole. Indeed, it would seem to 
count as a seriou~ objection to conceiving the cosmos as a 
unitary individual, as Hartshorne wishes- to do. 
The severity of,this problem--Hartshorne confesses 
that it is "the mostpuzzling indeeq of-all 112 --is in large-
part.owing to t}J.e rather. heavy reliance on the anal0gy be-
tween human consciousness and divine ,consciousness. Harts-
horne is aware of this and observes that 
If God here now is not, the same concrete unity of 
reality--as-Gocr-somewhere else 'now,' then the· 
simple analogy with human consciousness as a sin-
gle linear succession of states collapses~ I 
have mixed feelings about·this. It seems, on the 
one hand, that_ the idea of God as an.individual 
though cosmic being is thus compromised; but., on 
the other hand, I wonder if this is nQt· rather 
what we might expect when an analogy is .. extended 
to include deity. Maybe.it is. not di vine indi-
viduality that is threatened, but only the as~ 
sumption that this individuality should be simple· 
and easy for us to grasp. However, there is tl;ie 
haunting question, can physics, judging reality 
from the standpoin.t of l.ocalized observers, give 
us the deep truth about time as it would appear 
to a non-localized observer?3 
The last sentence in the above quotation rep:resents · 
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Hartshorne's some,what: tentative attempt: to formulate ~·so­
lution to this problem. God, .a.s cosmic observer of the· 
world process, is not·inone !peal~ rather than in ano1:her, 
but,;is·S01Dehow ubiquitous~ If this is:.,the ci:i.se,. Hartshorne 
argues'· God: could not. be thought of as moving from one' 
region.to another, an4 would thus.not represent a shifting 
standpoint relativ~ to other. shif:ting stantj.points. He says: 
As Professor John·B. Cpbb has remarked to me, 
whereas the relativity of simultaneity is .. con-. 
nected with the question of relative motions-of 
systems within whic~ obseryations~are being 
made compared to events being observed, unit'. 
events· themselves, (Whit.ehead's actual entities) 
do not, move .. but merely happen or becqme. . . . 
The cosmos .. is observable .. only from a localized 
and movable. station within itse.lf--unless the 
observer himself be cosmic.4 
Thus, ther~ would be. no question of transmiss.ion from 
one (non-divine} region to anqther· (divine) region, and so, 
presumably, no question. as· to. whet:t1er this could be· ac:-
complished at a velocity greater tha:r:i the.speed, of light. 
In t4is way, part of the force of t4e objection from rela-
tivity physics might po~sibly· be ... mitigated. Ne.vertheless, 
a more .elaborate and extensive treliltment' is .required if 
Hartshorne's centra+ thesis th.at God has unity of-.experi'" 
ence through successive occasions is not· to be placed in 
serious jeopardy. 
The.re is another. problem closely related to the pro~­
lem of: a divine simultaneity. Hartshorne ·mainta~ns that 
t~ere can be no a~tual togetherness of all possible .. vaiues). 
since sqme values ._are incompatible with each other--
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inc9mpatiblevalues cannot be simultaneously possessed by 
the same individual. However, it appears that Goq is not 
altogether safeguarded from,p0ssess·ing·incompatible values. 
Incompatible values can be held simultarieous1y by .. ,different 
individuals .. God, as the all-inclusive i:ndividual, is 
bound to possess every datum of· value as it occurs; addi-
ti,.onally, he possesses 'it with full awareness and adequacy. 
This being tl,le case, would not God include 1:he incompatible. 
values actualized by-the aforementioned individuals? Since, 
God "feels the.feelings!' of all others,. and.since some of 
those.others may at a~y given moment actualize incompatible 
feelings~ or values, would it not follow that God posse~ses: 
incompatible. feelings,, or values? For example: li vtng as 
an ignorant, simple,·m~nded peasant may have a certain value. 
peculiar to that sort of life; but the life of a· man with a 
highly-trained intellect, ·and wid~ knowledge, may .have·, a 
value :Peculiar to that· kind of.life. Yet\the two lives are· 
incompatible·with ea~h other~ A person who endeavors to 
live both lives ~simultaneously ~ould be diyided against 
himself, and could not, adequately realize either one. 
It may be objectec;l that· a person can,_achieye both 
vaiues, so loJ1g as he attempts e~ch at a· different time, so 
long as -th,e two endeavors are ·not made simultaneously. But 
if two different individuals .did actualize ,,such values si-
multaneously, God woul4 haye to inclµc;le them simul~aneously. 
Or is this the problem of simultaneity and; the poss.ibility 
of a cosmic present over again? Ce~tai~ly this sqrt of 
objection assumes that two individuals can simultaneously 
actualize value~, and that God simultaneously experiences 
these. But; as Bartshorne says: 
By speaking of: the perfect as 'enjoying'· the 
values of things, I mean to exclude the idea of a, 
mere collecti<;m of all things. The surpasser of 
all others must be a single·individual enjoying 
as his own. all the values of other individuals; 
and incapable of failing to do, so. For this, it 
is enough to suppose· that· the being is.~ound to 
have adequate knowledge.of events when and as 
they occur, and thereafter~ For adequately to 
know values-is to possess them; ancl to surpass 
the values of other beings it is enough to pos~ 
sess the values of every one, of them from the 
~time these values exist.s · 
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That these are important considerations-is.born,out by 
the fact. that.one of the. chief arguments Hartshorne employs 
against the notion of perfection as completeness is that 
incompatible values cannot achieve co-actualization within 
the same being. But· it· appears that God may be possesso.r 
of incompatible -values, and if this is ·true, his argument 
against the.classical idea of perfection is thereby 
weakened. 
The Past 
Hartshorne seems comfort;ible with.the idea of an in-
finite past. He maintains that process itself, as the 
over~all character of reality, does not emerge or become. 
And since .. di vine states·· are c;lependen t upon· the world states 
which they synthesize, and since there is no beginning to 
the series of divine experient occasions, it follows that 
process is without beginning and, therefore, it recedes 
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into an infinite past. This means that there is-no begin-. 
ning to the world, just as it means ther~ is no beginni~g 
to divinity. Both have always exist~~' albei~ as emergent 
process. 
Process, then, involves .. an infini ~e regress. Each· 
di vine 1experient occ~sion is Q.ependent. upon, previous .,exper-
ient occasions, which are themselves -dependent upon previous 
experient occasion~- ... and so on· ad infinitum_. This creates 
problems for Hartshorne's process·view. In the :first 
place, it makes ·it difficult to understand how an infinite· 
•' . . . . 
past may be a¢1.ded_ to; and if. an infini~e past; cannot,be 
added· to, the doc~rine that reality .is process, an advance 
into novelty, would be·· fatally undermined. The process. 
view maintains that reality is. constantly being enriched, 
as novel items -become; hence, the past.would receive -addi.-
tions ·to its reality. But how may, a beginningless ·series · 
be ·susceptible to addition?, One possible way wpuld involve 
selecting a, definite point within the series; and treating 
each subse-quent point a.\) an addition tp the· series. How-
ever, such a selection would be arbitrary--any point,within 
the series could serve as a, point from whic:h to caunt sub-
sequent .. points; Fµrthermore, the point se~ected would not 
be a genuine beginni~g, since it would have predecessors 
which could equally make.the sa;me c~aim~ Combining the 
doctrine of an infinite past. with, the·doctri,ne tha~· reality 
is also a creative advance seems tantamount, to claiming 
that·in,finity can b,e incre·B;sed. But.it is-·difficull: to see 
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the c9herence. in the idea of ''infinity plus one. 11 
Another difficulty, also related to the proble¥1 of·· the 
past, cpncerns the st,.atus of experient occasions after they 
have become.. ~a~~shorne argues that they do not lose their 
actuality. in becomin;g past because they are preserved. in 
their. full actuality in th~ perfect memory of God• That 
is, God does nQt·kn9w pa~t:occasions in jus~ their outline, 
even in, their esse.nti;il outline, but in tl1-eir, total, de:f;-
inite fullness-. Hence, God's memory co~trasts with non-· 
divine memory, which is ch~racterized by the inability to 
preserve each ex-perience in its full dejfini tenes·s. This 
would seem· to imply that the past is -as ··de·fini te and vivid 
to God as the-present is to us. Yet if this is true,.where 
is the distinction, for God, between past an4 present? For 
' ' . . 
us, the present is that which·. is· immediately felt or exper-
ienc;ed; as these experiences succeed one,,another, the pred-
ecessors .. lose, .thei! felt immeqia~y. By "felt immediacy" is 
mea~t th,e sensuoµsneas of the present moment; the cterm as~­
sµmes --th,at ther~ is a unique feeling quality, or feeling 
tone, which characterizes that experience and no ether. 
The freshness,. yi vidness and immediacy of our experiences. 
fade. And is.this.not what is implied by a succession of 
experiences? If the sensuousness of the present, fades for 
non-divine individuals, th~s-providing f~r a distinction 
between past, and.present, why wouldn't it also fade for 
God, who, according to Hartshorne, has a past as1well as· a 
present and a future? If God. suffers no loss of a1::tuality 
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in experiencing a succession of occasions,- it becomes -rather 
paradoxical to maintain that there is a divine past~ for 
all divine experiences are equally vivid for God. Indeed, 
on Hartshorne's view, it sounds as if God does not really 
have a past, but only. a present and a future. God ts .exper-
iences succeed one another, but do not lose their actuality 
in the cli vine life; in tl).is · res.pect, predec~ssors ·are in-
distinguishable from succe~sors. Pr~sumably, then, the 
only basis for distinguishing between past and present in 
God is just the assertion that he has ~a succession of ex~ 
periences, This· may be a. nece-ss ary condition for making a 
distinction between past and present, but, it is difficult 
to understand how it can be a sufficient condition for 
' ' ' ' \ 
making the distinction. 
This problem is.even.more.perplexing when considered 
in the light of Hartshorne's.axiom that the.concrete in-
cludes the abstract. On Hartshorne's own principles, there 
are grounds -to argue that tl:ie relation between, the past and 
the present is such that the present include5 the past, 
and, therefore, that the past is less definite _than (not 
equally definite with) the present, The considerations. 
supporting such an. infere·nce are as· follows: (1) each 
present_expe:rJent occasion is a synthesis of antecedent, or 
past, occasions, and includes them in, its unity; (2) but, 
since the concrete. always includes. the abs tract, it follows 
that the present, as the inclusive:item, is the concrete 
term of the re la ti on, and the past' is the .aps tract term; 
7 8 ' 
(3) concreteness. is distinguished from abstractness. by ·pos-, 
sessing greater definiteness .or determinatemesS:; 6 (4) there 
would: seem, then,· to be a loss of definiteness as items. 
move .. from the s~atus of being present to the status of be-
. 
ing past. It h,as .. been· suggeste·d above that this - loss may 
be described as a diminishing of the felt immediacy of the 
present moment~ a$ it is replace4 by apother~ fresh moment, 
which would be characterized by·· its own, unique· felt immed-
iacy. Ir God is not to be ma~e a:p. exception to these prin- · 
' ciples, it appears• as .. though his experiences. could not be 
fully preseryed. 
Should these ol:>jet:ti<ms ·have' any ferce, they carry. 
some. -disturbing implications· for Hartshorne' s doc'.trine ef 
immortality. For example, indiviQ.uals could not enjoy fu·il.l 
preservation in, the di vine life, bu~ only partial preserva-:-
tion. ·. Whether ihis :partial preservation, as neverthel~ss. 
r~dic~lly more preservative than that of which non-divine 
beings would be· capable'· would be sufficient for re];igious 
purposes is not .clear. Certainly part of the. force a~d 
at tr~cti veness of Hartshor:µe 's -:doctrine is that· it· describes 
a being who knows creatt1res .. as· they- are, and wh0 preserves 
this knowledge withou~ the.s~ightest possibility.of. f9rget~ 
fullness. On€1 may. be misundersteod by his fellows, or for-· 
gotten by- them~ but he is ·not, according to ~artshorne 1 
misunderstood or f\:'>rgotten-. by· God. 
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Assessment and Conclusion 
The aforementioned problems notwithstanding, Charles 
Hartshorne h,as.formµlated a provocative philosophical the-
ology.which attempts to move beyon4 the.failures, and. the 
achieveme~ts, of his predecessors. His view,s·concerning 
God have shown that. it·is:possible. to consider· the theistic 
question in a positive .and comprehensive way, withqut rely-
ing solely on the traditional concepts of being and abso-. ' ' 
luteness .- The . result has bee11 an exp ans ion. of· resources 
with which, to formulate the theistic position. In particu-
lar, Hartshorne' s dipolar cc;mcept of God makes it possible 
for him to clear. away.many of. the problems involved in 
maint~ining the notion of ~n absolute, immutable deity who 
is neverthel~ss relat~d to a world of, process and rela-
tivity. Furthermore, the old~r critiques of theism, and 
many of the current ones, can be shown to be less th~n 
convincing to the extent that they fail tq come to gf ips ~ 
with.a theism elaborated within~ process context. It is 
to be hoped that theists who are more comfortable in tradi-
tional mo~es of thought will be stimulated to reconsider, 
an4 perh~ps to reformulate, their views in· the light.of the 
criticisms made by Hartshorne from the process perspective. 
But the importance of aartshorne's theism e~tends be-
yond its capacity to engage philosophers .and theologians in 
a fruitful dialogue regarding the meaning of'. divinity. The 
view which he has been articulating and defending deserves 
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attention bec~use, in addition to its ;relevance to complex 
and subtle issues. in philosophical th,eology, it als0 has 
importance for la:r:ger questions·co:ricerning the significance 
and meaning of life. It-is especiall¥ relevant•to the 
searcli for basic aims,· beiiefs, an4 aspirations.. This con,-
tention requires some. explanation. 
Hartshorne ·has suggeste~ that in4ividuals live for the 
"glory of God," 7 that is, for a reality so supreme·. that, in 
Anse1m's words; "none·greater can be conceiyed." Surely, 
this -is in .. accord with th~ deepest feelings. and intuitions 
of many in4ividuals. For men do find it ennobli:p.g to think 
that their endeavors have an ultimate significance, th~t 
they count for something in the overall scheme of. things,. 
and that they are connecte<f with something which;is-unsur-
passable. The _id,ea. of a being who includes all e;x:perience 
within his own experienGe is. commensurate with; this·: For. 
Hartshorne, God is _the one ·-whose r!lnge_ of awareness is such 
that no endeavor is hidden from him·, Because all endeavors; 
may be understood as c<;mtributions -to his life, God may. be 
understood as.the referent for all endeavors. Since only 
he. is aware of and fully appreciates each and eyery. act, 
what .men do takes -on a profoun~ly important, significance. 
when placed within.Hartshor:p.e's theistic_perspective. The 
value which one.may create is a.genuine an~ everlasting 
contribution to the-divine life. No one· else could have 
created just that,partic~lar value. He~ce, each. in4ivi4u~l 
has a significance and worth which acquires permanence and 
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which death cannot· destroy. For his .life, his·-achievements, 
his very worth, are immortal in God's memory. 
There is a need for visi0ns as broad as Hartshorne 's, 
for they are what inspire. and su_stain men in the world. 
Men qmtinue to seek wholeness in. their way. of. understand-
ing reality. They continue· to search for the ideal most 
worthy of their commitments. Diss,tisfied with characteri-
• • ' I • • ' 
zations of. t~e world as fragmentary, an4 of individual en-
deavors as ultimately insignificant, they are.likely to 
find dipolar theism an appealing alternative. Ta thc;>.se who 
find themselves.asking what Houston Smith calls "the over-. 
arching questions !18 the thought. of Charles Hartshorne 
stands as a worthy exemplar. 
FOOTNOTES· 
1see: Hartshor:p.e, The Logi~ of P~r;fectic:m, p. ix. 
2Ha:rtshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time, p. 93. 
3Hartshorne, Creative· Synthes.is and, Philosophic 
Method, pp. 124-25. · · · · · 
4Hartshorne, ~Natural Theqlogy for Our Tiuie,, p. 94. 
5Hartshorne, The Divine· Relativity, p. 20. 
6Har1;:shorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic 
Method, pp~ 22-23. . . . . 
7Tnis suggestion was contained in, an· address delivered 
by Professor H,ar:tshorne at Oklahoma Sta:te·University, 
March 26, 1975, titled "Ways of Thin~ing About .. God. ii 
8Houston Smith, "Pea th and Rebirth in ~et~physics, ,.v 
in Process and Divinity: The Hartshorne.Festschrift: 
Philoso~hicar-Essays Presente\i to Charles Har:tshorne, 
ed.· by· illiam L. Reese and Eugene Freeuian, (~aSalle·, 
Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1964), p. 44. 
82. 
A SELECTE,D BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Brown,, Delwin; James, Ralph E..; and Ree·v.es, Gene,. eds. 
Pro7ess. Ph~lo$ophh and Ch!~stian Th0ught. · 
Ind1anapol1s: Bo·bs .. Merr1ll, 1971. 
Christian,. William A. An Interpretation of Whitehead's 
Metaphysics. N;ew Haven:· ·Yale University Press, 1959. 
Cohen, Morris R, A Preface to.Logic. New Yer~: He~ry Holt 
and Company,-1944, 
Gragg, Alan. Charles Hartshorne. Waco, Texas: Word 
Books, 1973. 
Hartshorn~, Char],es ~ Anselm's Disc.pvery '. A Re-Examination 
of the Ontological Argument for GocL's · Ex:tstence. · 
LaSalle, lllinoi~: · Open,Coµrt Publishing ~o., 1965. 
. Beyond Mumanism: Hssars, in the PhilosoEh..Y 0J 
---N....-at-ure. · Chieago: Willett; Cl art and Co. , 1937; 
reprinted:., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,. 
1968. , . 
Creative Sy~thesis and Philosophic· Method. 
LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Cp. , 19 70. 
The Divin~ Relativity:. A Soc:j.al Conception of 
· God~ The T~rry Lectures, 19 4 7. New Haven: Yale 
University Pres.s, 1948. · 
. "The God.of Religion and the .God of Philosophy." 
----=rn---,Talk of God~ Royal Institute of Phi1psophy 
Lectures;-vor:- Two: 1967-68, pp. 152-67. E<hted by-
G.N.A. Vesey. London; Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1969, 
. "The Idea of God--Literal or Analogical?" The 
---ch-ristia,n Scholar, XXXIX (June, 1956), 131-136. 
"Introductio:p._to See;:ondE4ition." St. Anselm: 
Basic. Writin~s ... Translated,by-S.N. _De!f.ne-.-. 2nd ed, 
LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court.Publishing Co.~ 1968. 
"Is God's Existence a State of Affairs?'' In 
Faith and the Philosoph~rs, pp. 26-33~ E~ited by 
John,Hick.---r{ew Yorl(: ·St. Martin's Press, 1964. 
83 
The Logic of Perfection. LaSalle, Illinois: 
Open Court t>ubliSKing Co., 1962.· 
. Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism. 
----=chr--r-icago: .· Willett, Cla~a~Co:"";" 1941; reprint·e~L, 
Hamden.,, Connecticut: Archon Books,,. 1964. 
84 
. . "Mind as MeJllory. and Creative LQve. 11 In Theories 
---o-f-the Mind, pp. 440~63. Edited by jc)rdan M. Scher'. 
New Yor~The Free Press of. Glencoe, 1962. 
--.._,,,.~: ~Natural The~logy for Our, Time~ LaSalle; 
Illinois:. ·Open· Court Publishing Co., 1967. 
"Panpsychism .. " In ~ History of Philos oph:j.cal 
Systems, pp. 442-53. Edited by Vergilius Ferm. 
New York: The Philosophic~! Library, 1950. 
"Pers9nal Iden.ti ty from A to Z. '' Process· 
Stu~ies, II (Fall, 1972), 209-15. 
, and Reese, William L, Philosophers Spe-~k of God. 
---c=h ...... 1 ..... cago: The Uni ver~ ity of Chicago Press , 19 5 3. · 
--"""'=".--..-'. The Philosc;>l'hY ~.Psychology_ of: Sens~tion. 
Chicago: The University .oFCE;icago Press, 1934; 
reprint e~., Port Washington, Ne~ York: Ke~nikat 
Press, 1968. 
"The Philosophy of Creative Synthesis.u The 
Journal_ of Ph,ilpsoph;y, LV (October 23, 1958), 944-53. 
__ ....,,.....,...._• Reality. as. Social Process: Stu.dies in 
·Metaphysics ai:i<rReligicm. Glencoe: The .Free :Press, 
and Bost.on:.--rh;"e B~acon Press, 1953;.reprint ed., 
New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 19,71 . 
. "Religion in.Process Philosophy." In Religion 
----.-in-. -··Philosophical; and C.ul.tural Perspective, pp. 246-6 8. 
Ecli ted by. J. Clayton Fe aver and William· Horos z .. 
Princeton: D. Vail. Nostrand, 196 7. 
"Twe],ve Elements of My Philosophy." The 
Southwestern Journal. of Phl.losophy, V (Spriiig, 1974), 
7-15~ . . . . 
. "What Did Anselm Discover?" ln The,Many-Faced 
---A ....... -r-gument ~ · · Rec;:ent Studies on the Ontol9irc:al Argument 
for the·Existence of God, pp. 321-33~ Edited by 
John Hick and Arthur C.-McGill. New Yor~.: 
Macmillan, 196 7. 
"Whitehead in French Perspective: A Review 
Article." The Thomist, XXXIII (July 3, 1969), 
573-81. -
. Whitehead's Philosophy: Collected Essays, 
---1-9-3-5-1970. · Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
19 7 2 •. 
James, Ralph E. The Concrete God: A New Beginning for 
Theology,. -The Thought, of Charles f{"a"rtshor:he. --
IndianapolIST Bob :S -Merrill, 196 ; 
Minor, William S., ed. Directives from Charles Hart:shorne 
and Henrf Nelson Wieman· CriticaITt Analyzed. ·. 
PliTlos op y of Crea ti vi ty Monograp Series, Vo 1. I. 
Carbondale, Illinois: T~e Found~tion for Creative 
Philosophy, Inc., 1969. 
Pascal. Pense'es. Translated by A.J. Krailsheimer. 
Baltimore: Penguin B6oks~ 1966. 
85 
Pegis, Anton C., ed. Basic Writ:ings of St. Thomas.Aquinas. 
2 vols. New York: Random House-,-1945. 
Peters, Eugene H. Hartshorne and Neoclassical Metaphysics~ 
Lincoln~ Uniyersity of Neoraska Press~· 1970. 
Reese, William L ~ and Freeman, Eugene. Proce:ss . and 
Di v:j..ni ty: The H.artshorne Festsc;hr:i~t.:'· PfiiIOSophical 
Essays Presented. to Charles Hartsbe'rne. LaSalle, 
Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1964. 
Rome, Sydney and ~eatrice, eds. 
Interrogations. New York: 
Wins.ton, 1964. 
PhilosoJ?hical 
Holt, Rinehart and 
Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality: An,Essay in 
Cosmology. New York: Macmillan, 1929; reprfnt ed., 
New York: The Free -Press, 1969. 
VITA 
Terry Richa~q Hall 
Candidate for the. Degree. of 
Master of Arts 
Thesis: THE DIVINE l3ECOMH{G: ·. AN EXAMINATION OF CHARLES 
HARTSBORNE'S CON~EPT OF GOD 
Major Field: Philosophy 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Leng Bea~h, California,. 
February 4, 1949, the· son of Mr. ·and Mrs. 
Charles R, Hall. 
Education: Graduated from East Central High School, 
Tulsa, Oklah~ma,in May, 1967; received the 
Bachel9r of Arts .-degree· from Oklahoma State 
University, St~llwater, Oklahoma,·in.1971, with 
a major in Humi:mi t~es; completed requirements 
for. the Master of Arts degree at Oklahoma State 
University in, July, 1975. 
Professionl;ll Experience:- Employe·d by Oklahoma State.· 
University as "a gradµate assi.stant from 
January, 1973 to May, 1975. 
